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ABSTRACT 
We develop a modeling tool to represent freight container flows and the potential 
changes in cost of those flows inflicted on the U.S. commercial transportation system by 
a Transportation Security Incident (TSI).  Our model includes available data on container 
movements, origin-destination (O-D) matrices for international container flows entering 
or leaving the U.S., and development of an attacker-defender model to determine best 
contingency plans after a TSI.  We design a multi-commodity network flow model, 
representing flows between foreign countries and North American ports, the modal 
volumes into and out of each port, and volumes between each port and the 84 U.S. 
Transportation Analysis Zones.  Each O-D flow is a commodity with a specified origin 
and destination.  Subject to constraints on total flow volume over the arcs, these 
commodities flow through the network at minimum cost.  The model finds paths through 
the network for containers to minimize their total transportation costs, and identifies a set 
of the most-critical infrastructure components of the commercial container transportation 
system that could be affected by a transportation security incident.  This tool can help 
decision makers identify critical components to improve security and capacity on existing 
commercial transportation infrastructure in an environment with limited available 
funding. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
International containerized freight movement is a vital part of the supply chain for 
many companies, and a critical element of moving consumer goods to points of retail sale 
within the U.S.  Containerized imports also present a clear security concern.  The 
potential for terrorists to ship dirty bombs, chemical or biological weapons, or even a 
nuclear weapon into the U.S. in a shipping container has been widely recognized and 
interdiction of such shipments is a primary objective of the Department of Homeland 
Security.  A goal of U.S. Customs and Border Protection is the modeling of supply chain 
operations and the ability to estimate economic impacts of security-driven delays to 
material entering the U.S. 
We introduce a tool to represent container flows and the potential changes in 
those flows under a variety of conditions (port disruptions, extensive security-related 
delays, natural disasters, and so forth).  This tool includes available data on container 
movements, estimation of origin-destination matrices for international container flows 
entering or leaving the U.S., and development of a network model to represent container 
movements, in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), both internationally and 
domestically.  This international network model allows flow diversions between U.S. 
ports because of implementation of security initiatives or port disruptions.  
Foreign origins and destinations include 46 countries that, the American 
Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) says in 2009 account for approximately 96 
percent of containers imported by the U.S. through seaports and approximately 93 
percent of U.S. seaborne exports.  The set of foreign origins and destinations does not 
include Canada and Mexico.  While these two countries are among the U.S.’s largest 
trading partners, nearly all of the import—export movement is via overland border 
crossings, not through seaports.  The U.S.—Canadian and U.S.—Mexican border 
crossings are not included in this analysis. 
The AAPA also states that more than 90 percent of total containerized traffic 
entering or leaving the U.S. (measured in TEUs) moves through 14 large ports.  These 
 xvi
ports are Los Angeles, Long Beach, Oakland, Seattle and Tacoma on the Pacific Coast, 
New York, Baltimore, Norfolk-Hampton Roads, Charleston, Savannah, Jacksonville, Port 
Everglades (Ft. Lauderdale) and Miami on the Atlantic Coast, and Houston on the Gulf 
Coast.  The ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach operate separately, but are physically 
adjacent and for this thesis are modeled as one.  Similarly, Seattle and Tacoma are two 
separate ports, but because they are very close to one another, we group them together.  
Finally, Miami and Port Everglades are also two separate ports that have been grouped 
together to represent a South Florida port for the analysis.  Thus, we consider 11 U.S. 
locations as ports, including all 14 of the largest individual facilities. 
In addition, Vancouver and Prince Rupert in Canada and Lazaro Cardenas in 
Mexico are ports on the Pacific Coast that are entry points for containers that 
subsequently enter the U.S. via land crossings.  Thus, 14 ports are represented for U.S. 
imports and exports.  In general, we will refer to these 14 ports as the North American 
ports and the ports in other parts of the world as foreign ports.  Although Vancouver, 
Prince Rupert, and Lazaro Cardenas are not on U.S. soil, there is little sea traffic from 
them to U.S. ports, so the focus is on their role as possible points-of-landing for 
containers that are ultimately destined for U.S. locations. 
Inside the U.S., we aggregate shipment origins and destinations into 84 
Transportation Analysis Zones (TAZs).  Each TAZ represents a collection of counties 
and a major city in each zone represents each TAZ.  Between the ports and the cities 
representing TAZs, the model includes both rail and truck connections, reflecting the 
modal choice made by shippers for the domestic part of their supply chain. 
The overall model is a network multi-commodity flow model, depicting flows 
between foreign countries and North American ports, the total volumes handled (import 
and export) by each port, the modal volumes (truck and rail) into and out of each port, 
and volumes between each port and each TAZ.  The principal reflection of congestion in 
the model is in the capacity limits for rail connections at the ports.  The model finds paths 
through the network for shipments to minimize their total logistics cost, in travel days, 
which affects transportation and inventory costs. 
 xvii
We use an Attacker-Defender model to manipulate our transportation network.  
The model allows the attacker, or leader, to first attack the network, and then the 
defender, or follower, optimally alters flow of container TEUs on the surviving network.  
Solving this model for the best response to the worst attack shows how we can identify 
critical nodes that correspond to the worst-case attack. 
Our research reveals that aside from a terrorist attack on the commercial container 
transportation system the most expensive scenario on that system is when the Pacific 
Maritime Association Board of Directors locks down the West Coast Ports.  The lockout 
of longshoremen, dockworkers, and marine clerks causes a 43.92% transportation cost 
increase.  We have also found an increase of 14.75% in additional transportation costs 
when a 7.8 earthquake shakes Southern California and closes the ports of Los Angeles 
and Long Beach for a period of 14 days.  The closure of the ports of Savannah and 
Charleston, due to a postulated hurricane, will only increase the transportation costs by 
0.64%.  A reduction in throughput at the Port of Oakland due to increased container 
security measures would affect overall costs by only 0.53%.  In both the Savannah-
Charleston and Oakland scenarios, the other regional ports are capable of absorbing the 
rerouted containers.  Finally, we determine the five optimal attacks an intelligent terrorist 
might employ to maximize the cost on the U.S. economy.  Although we include three 
North American ports not on U.S. soil, all five plans include only domestic U.S. ports.  
The five optimal target ports for a terrorist are Los Angeles and Long Beach, Oakland, 
Seattle and Tacoma, Baltimore and New York and New Jersey. 
 xviii
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International containerized freight movement is a vital part of the supply chain for 
many companies and a critical element of moving consumer goods to points of retail sale 
within the U.S.  Containerized imports also present a clear security concern.  The 
potential for terrorists to ship dirty bombs, chemical or biological weapons, or even a 
nuclear weapon into the U.S. in a shipping container has been widely recognized.  A U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection’s long-term goal is the modeling of supply-chain 
operations and the ability to estimate economic impacts of security-driven delays to 
material entering the United States (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2009). 
Currently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses the Risk Analysis 
and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP-Plus) program to analyze and 
manage risk to transportation infrastructure assets and systems.  RAMCAP-Plus 
systematically identifies and ranks critical facility assets that, if attacked by terrorists or 
exposed to other hazards, could potentially produce significant and adverse impacts.  
RAMCAP-Plus allows users to conduct vulnerability and risk assessments, starting with 
the identification of critical assets and culminating in the management of risk for the 
entire facility (Alion Science and Technology , 2007). 
We introduce a modeling tool to represent container flows, and the potential 
changes in those flows, under a variety of Transportation Security Incidents (port 
disruptions, extensive security-related delays, natural disasters, and so forth).  It includes 
available data on container movements, origin-destination (O-D) matrices for 
international container flows entering or leaving the U.S., and development of a network 
model to represent container movements both internationally and domestically. 
Our model includes capacities on total flow through each port, and on each rail 
link.  Road links are uncapacitated in our model, and we do not model time delays due to 
handling inefficiencies in ports.  For our data, the capacities on the rail links are more 
constraining than port capacities. 
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Foreign origins and destinations include 46 countries, as shown in Table 1, that 
account for approximately 96 percent of containers imported by the U.S. through seaports 
and approximately 93 percent of U.S. seaborne exports (American Association of Port 
Authorities, 2009).  The set of foreign origins and destinations does not include Canada 
and Mexico.  While these two countries are among the U.S.’s largest trading partners, 
nearly all of the import—export movement is via overland border crossings, not through 







ARGENTINA Buenos Aires ISRAEL Haifa
AUSTRALIA Melbourne ITALY Gioia Tauro
AUSTRIA Trieste JAPAN Tokyo
BANGLADESH Chittagong MALAYSIA Singapore
BELGIUM Antwerp NETHERLANDS Rotterdam
BRAZIL Santos NEW ZEALAND Tauranga (Auckland)
CHILE Valparaiso PAKISTAN Karachi
CHINA MAINLAND Shanghai PERU Callao
CHINA TAIWAN Kaohsiung PHILIPPINES Manila
COLOMBIA Manga (Cartegena) POLAND Gdansk
COSTA RICA Puerto Limon PORTUGAL Lisbon
DENMARK Aarhus RUSSIA St. Petersburg
DOMINICAN REP Caucedo SINGAPORE Singapore
ECUADOR Guayaquil SOUTH AFRICA Durban
EL SALVADOR Acajutla SOUTH KOREA Busan
FINLAND Helsinki SPAIN Algeciras
FRANCE Le Havre SRI LANKA Colombo
GERMANY Hamburg SWEDEN Gothenburg
GUATEMALA Puerto Cortes THAILAND Laem Chabang (Bangkok)
HONDURAS Puerto Cortes TURKEY Izmir
HONG KONG Hong Kong UNITED KINGDOM Felixstowe
INDIA Jawaharlal Nehru (Mumbai) VENEZUELA Puerto Cabello
INDONESIA Jakarta VIETNAM Ho Chi Minh City  
Table 1.   Table of 46 foreign countries, each represented by its most prominent port 
More than 90 percent of total containerized traffic entering or leaving the U.S. 
(measured in twenty-foot equivalent units [TEUs]) moves through 14 large ports 
(American Association of Port Authorities, 2009).  These ports are Los Angeles, Long 
Beach, Oakland, Seattle and Tacoma on the Pacific Coast, New York, Baltimore, 
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Norfolk-Hampton Roads, Charleston, Savannah, Jacksonville, Port Everglades (Ft. 
Lauderdale) and Miami on the Atlantic Coast, and Houston on the Gulf Coast.  The ports 
of Los Angeles and Long Beach operate separately, but are physically adjacent and 
regarded as one for this analysis.  Similarly, Seattle and Tacoma are two separate ports, 
but because they are very close to one another, we group them together.  Finally, Miami 
and Port Everglades are also two separate ports that have been grouped together to 
represent a “South Florida” port for the analysis.  Thus, we consider 11 U.S. locations as 
ports, including all 14 of the largest individual facilities. 
In addition, Vancouver and Prince Rupert in Canada and Lazaro Cardenas in 
Mexico are ports on the Pacific Coast that are entry points for containers that 
subsequently enter the U.S. via land crossings.  Thus, the model has 14 ports represented 
for U.S. imports and exports.  In general, we will refer to these 14 ports as the North 
American ports and the ports in other parts of the world as foreign ports.  Although 
Vancouver, Prince Rupert, and Lazaro Cardenas are “foreign” from a U.S. perspective, 
there is little sea traffic from them to U.S. ports, so the focus is on their role as possible 
points-of-landing for containers that are ultimately destined for U.S. locations.  Table 2 
below summarizes the 14 ports represented in the model. 
Baltimore Port Norfolk Port
Charleston Port Oakland Port
Houston Port Prince Rupert, BC Port
Jacksonville Port Savannah Port
Lazaro Cardenas, MX Port Seattle -Tacoma Ports
Los Angeles - Long Beach Ports South Florida Port
New York - New Jersey Ports Vancouver, BC Port  
Table 2.   14 North American ports represented in the model 
Inside the U.S., shipment origins and destinations are aggregated into 84 
Transportation Analysis Zones (TAZs).  Named by the major cities shown in Table 3, 
each TAZ represents a collection of counties.  Between the ports and the cities 
representing TAZs, the model includes both rail and truck connections, reflecting the 
modal choice made by shippers for the domestic part of their supply chain. 
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Albany, NY Dayton, OH Las Vegas, NV Portland,OR
Albuquerque, NM Denver, CO Lexington, KY Raleigh, NC
Atlanta, GA Des Moines, IA Little Rock, AR Redding, CA
Austin, TX Detroit, MI Los Angeles, CA Richmond, VA
Baltimore, MD Duluth, MN Louisville, KY Rochester, NY
Billings, MT El Paso, TX Memphis, TN Sacramento, CA
Birmingham, AL Fargo, ND Miami, FL Salt Lake City, UT
Boise City, ID Fort Wayne, IN Milwaukee, WI San Antonio, TX
Boston, MA Fresno, CA Minneapolis, MN San Diego, CA
Buffalo, NY Grand Rapids, MI Mobile, AL San Jose, CA
Charleston, SC Green Bay, WI Nashville, TN Savannah, GA
Charleston,WV Greensboro, NC New Orleans, LA Seattle, WA
Charlotte, NC Greenville, NC New York, NY Sioux Falls, SD
Chattanooga, TN Greenville, SC Norfolk, VA Springfield, MO
Chicago, IL Harrrisburg, PA Oklahoma City, OK St. Louis, MO
Cincinnati, OH Houston, TX Omaha, NE Syracuse, NY
Cleveland, OH Indianapolis, IN Orlando, FL Tampa, FL
Columbia, SC Jackson, MS Philadelphia, PA Toledo, OH
Columbus, OH Jacksonville, FL Phoenix, AZ Tulsa, OK
Corpus Christi, TX Kansas City, MO Pittsburgh, PA Wichita, KS
Dallas, TX Knoxville, TN Portland, ME Wilmington, NC  
Table 3.   84 Transportation Analysis Zones represented in the model 
The overall model is a network multi-commodity flow model, representing flows 
between foreign countries and North American ports, the total volumes handled (import 
and export) by each port, the modal volumes (truck and rail) into and out of each port, 
and volumes between each port and each TAZ.  The principal reflection of congestion in 
the model is in the ports, and in the capacity limits for rail connections at the ports.  The 
model finds paths through the network for containers to minimize their total 
transportation costs, expressed here as transit days. 
After the model finds the optimal solution to operate the transportation system at 
minimum cost, an intelligent adversary will attack the network with the goal of 
maximizing the operator’s (or transportation system’s) total transportation cost.  Our 
findings present the adversary’s optimal attack options and the respective costs of each to 
the transportation system.  The operator then optimizes the flow of goods through the  
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surviving network.  The idea is to find the key components that a transportation security 
incident might influence adversely, even when the system responds optimally to any 
casualty. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK 
The study of multimodal network modeling is not new.  Kresge and Roberts 
(1971) developed a significant multimodal predictive freight network model: the 
“Harvard-Brookings” model.  The network used in their model consists of links that 
represent the available paths with constant O-D perceived shipping costs and nodes that 
represent the cities or regions serving as origins or destinations.  Shippers’ modal choices 
are determined through shortest path calculations for the intermodal network.  Their 
model is focused on transport problems in developing countries and represents 
application of the economic concept of spatial price equilibrium.  Spatial price 
equilibrium models focus on producer-consumer-shipper interactions.  The producers and 
the consumers act in a set of geographically-separated regions, or centroids, while the 
shippers determine the trading pattern that brings economic (supply-demand) 
equilibrium. 
During the 1980s, there was significant work on freight network models focusing 
on the shipper-carrier interactions.  For those models, demands are assumed to be known 
and are routed on the carriers’ networks such that the carriers’ costs are minimized.  The 
work by Friesz and Harker (1985) includes both the carrier decisions with respect to 
routing and a spatial price equilibrium framework to represent the demand side of the 
model.  Their work is quite sophisticated, but proves difficult to support with available 
data and raises significant computational issues. 
Jones, Qu, Casavant, and Koo (1995) focus on export wheat shipments through 
ports in the Pacific Northwest.  They formulate a spatial price equilibrium model as a 
quadratic programming problem, where the regions are 11 wheat exporting areas in the 
United States and 14 international wheat importing areas.  They represent eight United 
States and Canadian ports, through which the United States’ wheat exports flow.  The key 
variables are regional prices and flows.  They use their model to examine effects of 
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possible changes in international markets (such as a Chinese quarantine on U.S. wheat 
shipments) and changes in the regional transportation system (such as closure of the 
Columbia-Snake River system to barges) on flows through ports, regional prices, and so 
forth.  Their model is of interest because of its focus on spatial price equilibrium and 
ports, but it is quite dated (data from 1989), and the commodity and strong regional focus 
make it less directly related to the current work than the model developed somewhat later 
by Luo and Grigalunas (2003).  
Luo and Grigalunas describe a flow model intended to estimate the volumes of 
containers flowing through various U.S. ports, and how those volumes might change 
under modified port fees.  Their model, as the one described in this thesis, is based on a 
premise that shippers attempt to minimize total logistics costs, including both 
transportation and inventory costs.  However, they have no capacity constraints in their 
model, so the route selected for each O-D pair is just a shortest path calculation.  They 
then add the flows on paths that use a given port to get total port volume. 
They use a set of six foreign origin areas (continents) and define U.S. areas as 
states, except in the Northeast, where they disaggregate to counties.  They estimated O-D 
tables for 31 commodity groups, based on data published by the U.S. Maritime 
Administration.  These data give weight and value by commodity class from foreign 
origins to the United States in total (and reverse for exports), but they do not give TEUs, 
nor do they say anything about where in the United States the shipments originate or 
terminate. 
They represented a set of 14 U.S. ports (with Seattle-Tacoma and Los Angeles-
Long Beach each considered as one).  Their calibration results (based on observed total 
port volumes) match a few ports (New York, Houston, and Seattle) reasonably well, but 
show disparities in several others (Los Angeles-Long Beach, Oakland, Charleston, and 
Jacksonville).  Overall, their O-D estimates are based on very little demand data.  
However, the general direction of their work is very useful to us. 
Lee, Chew, and Lee (2006), who develop a multi-commodity network flow model 
to estimate the demand at the ports of the Asia-Pacific region, take a similar approach.  
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They use their model to study the sensitivity of the cargo flow between ports with respect 
to efficiency, port charges, and shipping costs. 
Other recent efforts in freight equilibrium models include work by Fernandez, de 
Cea, and Soto (2003); Safwat and Hasan (2004); and Agrawal and Ziliaskopoulos (2006).  
These represent varying ways of representing the interaction of shippers and carriers, as 
well as various ways of modeling different transportation modes and carriers’ decisions 
regarding shipment routing. 
Mahmassani, et al. (2007), propose a more tactical-level model.  They present a 
simulation-based dynamic network assignment model that enables the micro-assignment 
of shipments.  Their model is designed to evaluate service networks, including terminal 
delays and consolidation policies at classification yards, intermodal transfer terminals, 
and ports. 
We also note the work done by Malchow and Kanafani (2001), on competition 
among alternative ports.  They use a discrete choice model to analyze the distribution of 
maritime shipments among the ports in the United States.  However, this is not done in 
the context of a larger freight network model. 
Finally, we note the recent effort that has been devoted to the application of 
optimal network interdiction to critical infrastructure protection (Brown, Carlyle, 
Salmeron, and Wood, 2006) at the Naval Postgraduate School.  This thesis continues that 
effort, formalizes the notion of an optimal attack for a multi-commodity network flow 
problem, and provides analysis and computational implementation to solve it efficiently.  
We construct a model to take advantage of some of these previous ideas, but also to focus 
less on issues related to world market prices, port handling charges, and so forth, and 
more on the potential effects of physical disruptions to the supply-chain infrastructure 
and potential operational changes due to a transportation security incident.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. WHY IS IT MANDATORY TO PLAN FOR DISRUPTIONS IN THE 
COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM? 
1. What is “Infrastructure”? 
The American Heritage Dictionary defines the term infrastructure as: 
The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning 
of a community or society, such as transportation and communications 
systems, water and power lines, and public institutions including schools, 
post offices, and prisons. 
 
2. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 establishes a national policy for 
Federal departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and protect critical infrastructure 
from terrorist attacks (Department of Homeland Security, 2003).  The National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is the Department of Homeland Security’s plan to 
direct our national strategy for executing the President’s Directive.  The 18 Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) sectors are agriculture and food, defense 
industrial base, energy, healthcare and public health, national monuments and icons, 
banking and finance, water, chemical, commercial facilities, critical manufacturing, 
dams, emergency services, nuclear reactors, information technology, communications, 
postal and shipping, transportation systems and government facilities. 
The sector specific agency responsible for transportation systems is the 
Transportation Security Administration.  Along with the Department of Homeland 
Security, it is responsible for all matters relating to transportation security and 
transportation infrastructure protection (Department of Homeland Security, 2009).  
3. Department of Homeland Security Risk Assessment  
In the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) has promoted Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for 
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assessing the threats posed by intelligent adversaries in a terrorist attack (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009).  Currently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses 
the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP-Plus) 
program to perform PRA.  RAMCAP-Plus is a program that allows users to conduct 
vulnerability and risk assessments, starting with the identification of critical assets and 
culminating in the management of risk for the entire facility (Alion Science and 
Technology, 2007).  Use of RAMCAP-Plus identifies vulnerable nodes in a network, so 
decision makers can make the vulnerable nodes more resistant to attack.  RAMCAP-Plus 
ranks the infrastructure by amount of flow and defends the highest flow arc first, 
followed by the second, third, and so on until all available resources are used.   
We have misgivings about this simplified ranking.  The U.S. transportation 
system is quite flexible, and capable of accommodating re-routed flows around 
components rendered inoperable for any cause.  Further, evaluating components in 
isolation misses key relationships among sets of components.  So, we advise actually 
modeling the function of the transportation system, and how its operators would respond 
to any damage.  
B. ATTACKER-DEFENDER MODEL 
We use the term “Attacker-Defender” (AD) model to define a type of Stackelberg 
game (Stackelberg, 1952) that has been extensively studied for analyzing vulnerabilities 
of critical infrastructure (e.g., Wood, 1993; Salmeron et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2006; 
Salmeron et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2008).  We choose to use the attacker-defender 
model to provide a better representation of the transportation infrastructure and how it 
can be managed.  Our assessment of critical infrastructure components and the defensive 
investments that preserve system function in an optimal manner proceeds in two steps. 
1. The Operator’s Model 
We start by offering a model for the behavior of the system under normal 
operating conditions, which we call the operator’s model.  The system need not have an 




system has a clearly stated operating objective, “minimize cost” in our case, and that we 
represent any constraints affecting how the system can operate, be they capacity limits, or 
flow controls, etc.  
The natural language for representing the tension between a system’s objectives 
and its capabilities is constrained optimization.  If we use the vector of decision variables 
y to denote an “operating plan” for the infrastructure system, we can state the operator’s 
problem simply as the following mathematical programming problem: 
min ( ), (D)
y Y
f y  
where Y represents the set of all feasible operating plans, and the function f represents our 
measure of performance for any feasible operating plan.  Here, we have chosen to state 
the operator’s problem as a minimization problem (e.g., minimize the transportation cost 
of the system in our model).  The variables y represent decisions about movement, 
assignment, or allocation of goods, materials, budget, equipment, energy, vehicles, 
platforms, personnel, information, money, or anything else related to system operation.  
The set Y of feasible operating plans allows us to capture limited operator resources, 
capacity limitations within the system, as well as dependencies between system 
components.  Constrained optimization problems of this type have been studied 
extensively for over sixty years and are limited only by the imagination of the modeler to 
capture domain-specific details of interest (e.g., Rardin, 1997 or Ahuja et al., 1993). 
2. The “Attacker’s Problem” 
We next answer the question, what course of action will maximize the disruption 
to the system, anticipating an optimal response by the system operator?  We can model 
maximally disruptive attacks on an infrastructure system through a bi-level mathematical 
program of this form (Danskin, 1967 and Moore and Bard, 1990): 
 ( )
max min ( | ), (AD)
y Y xx X
f y x  
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where xk = 1 if component k of the system is attacked, and xk = 0 otherwise; x X 
represents an anticipated set of resource constraints on an attacker, including the 
restriction that attacks are binary; y  Y (x) denotes constraints on any operating plans as 
influenced by the “attack plan” x.  Here we assume, without any loss of generality, that 
the attack variables x only influence the objective function; they can have an indirect 
influence on the feasible region of y through large penalty coefficients in the objective.  
The inner minimization still represents a system operator, a group of informed system 
users, or a set of automated protocols that will identify the best way to operate the system 
depending on its state.  The outer maximization assumes that an “attacker” understands 
how the “operator” runs his system and seeks to inflict maximum harm to that system. 
C. DATA SOURCES AND ORIGIN-DESTINATION CONTAINER 
MOVEMENTS 
1. Demand Data 
Based on PIERS data for 2007, sixty-seven countries represent about 99 percent 
of the containers that entered the United States (PIERS Global Intelligence Solutions, 
2008).  From the U.S. Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) maritime statistics page, 
Figure 1 shows container imports to the United States in 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 
from the ten largest trading partners (U.S. Maritime Administration, 2009).  China is the 
largest, representing over 47 percent of containers imported in 2007 and experiencing 
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Figure 1.   Waterborne containerized import and export TEUs from the 10 largest 
trading partners (From: U.S. Maritime Administration, 2009) 
As shown in Figure 2 from MARAD’s 2008 data, the largest exporters to the 
United States represent 99.05 percent of all imports and are grouped into three distinct 
regions: Asia (representing 75.98 percent of U.S. imports), Europe (13.09 percent), and 



















Figure 2.   Waterborne containerized percentage of imports by world region in 2007 
(From: U.S. Maritime Administration, 2008) 
The PIERS data are very useful for understanding the routes that containers 
follow from an origin country, through a foreign port, and through a U.S. port.  For 
example, Figure 3 illustrates two sample routes for a shipment from Germany to Kansas 
City, Missouri.  The first route goes through the port of Lisbon in Portugal and then the 
port of New York-New Jersey, while the second route goes through the port of 
Bremerhaven in Germany and then the port of New York-New Jersey.  The data include a 
distinction between origin country and departure country, the country where the cargo is 
loaded onto a ship destined for the United States.  The data provide observations of flow 
from origin country to departure port, and from departure port (that is, nodes of type 1 in 
Figure 3) to entry port in the United States (nodes of type 2 in Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.   Example of two import flow paths from a foreign origin country (Germany) 
to a U.S. destination (Kansas City, MO) distinguished by foreign port of 
origin (Bremerhaven or Lisbon). 
The PIERS data does not include information on the U.S. domestic movement 
(nodes of type 3 in Figure 3).  PIERS records movements (in TEUs) from origins to U.S. 
ports.  There is high consistency between the total recorded volumes of imports by U.S. 
port and the origin-specific data, but once the shipment has entered the United States, 
there is no record of its final destination. 
The rail waybill sample collected by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) is 
one source of data on the domestic leg of container movements.  This is a sample of 
records of rail car movements between Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Economic 
Areas (EA) within the United States, which includes the commodity moved and other 
data.  The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis defines these 
Economic Areas as geographic regions composed of a collection of counties that 
represent centers of regional economic activity and aggregate actual origins and 
destinations of shipments (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2004).  The “Transportation 
Analysis Zones” (TAZs) used for this thesis are aggregations of BEA’s Economic Areas, 
allowing use of the rail waybill data to provide information on the domestic movement of 
containers, at least those that move by rail.  For simplification purposes each TAZ is 
(1)
(1)







represented by a major city within it, denoted a centroid, shown in Figure 4.  Each 
centroid serves as the modeled origin (for exports) or destination (for imports) for freight 
movements for the entire zone. 
 
Figure 4.   Transportation Analysis Zones (TAZs) and centroid city locations 
With multiple destinations for rail and truck movements from each domestic port 
represented, we replicate the structure in Figure 5 for rail and truck links for each 
destination.  However, data on the rail-truck mode split for each destination from each 
port are not available, so we present a simplified approach in section 7 of this chapter.  





Figure 5.   Sample arcs from a foreign port to a destination TAZ 
In the overall network, shown in Figure 6, there are connections between foreign 
ports and various North American ports.  Each of the arcs has costs and times based on 
country sailing distances.  This allows the overall model to represent several possible 
paths for each O-D pair—using alternate ports as well as choice of rail or truck for the 
movement between the port and the destination.  From each of the North American ports 
represented in the model, there is a sub-network like the one shown in Figure 5 extending 
inland to the 84 TAZs to represent import flows. 
For exports, as shown in Figure 6 below, there is a comparable structure, but with 
the links oriented in the opposite direction.  All flows, whether import or export, move 
through the port facilities, making them the central elements of the overall network 
model.  If the ports become congested, delays increase and shippers have an incentive to 
use alternate routes. 
  




Rail Transport + DrayageForeign Port TAZ
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Figure 6.   The bi-modal commercial container transportation network.  An import 
container begins travel in a foreign port, enters the U.S. via a domestic port 
and can either be shipped by rail or truck to a U.S. destination.  An export 
container begins travel in a U.S. TAZ, is then shipped to a port via rail or 
truck and transported via ship to a foreign destination.  At any point, the 
model may choose to ship it directly to the destination, for an additional cost 
or it may choose to delay the container, again for an additional delay cost. 
2. Port-to-port Distances 
We used the port-to-port distances from the website www.distances.com.  A 
sample of the data collected electronically from distances.com has been checked against 
data in National Imagery and Mapping Agency Publication 151, Distances between Ports 
(U.S. Department of Defense National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 2001), and 
differences are less than 2.5% for all port-to-port pairs checked.  Lazaro Cardenas is not 
listed by distances.com, so we used Manzanillo, Mexico, as an approximate location.  
Manzanillo is relatively close to Lazaro Cardenas, so the error should not affect solutions 
significantly. 
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3. Port-to-port Sailing Times 
The sailing times are simply the port-to-port distances, divided by an average 
speed of 20 knots, and rounded up to the next whole day.  We derive the 20-knot average 
speed from average sailing speeds of large container ships listed in "Container Insight," 
June 2007 as listed in Table 4 below. 
 
 
Table 4.   Characteristics of the world containership fleet (From: Drewry Publications, 
June 2007). 
4. Domestic Port to Transportation Analysis Zone Distances 
The overland distances from ports of entry to destination zones (TAZs) come 
from calculations in TransCAD using the full U.S. rail network (the “Oak Ridge” 
network).  We use these distances for both rail and truck shipments.  There may be some 
discrepancies between road distances and rail distances for some port-TAZ pairs, but 
these are not likely to be large enough to be problematic. 
The three ports outside the U.S. (Prince Rupert, Vancouver, and Lazaro Cardenas) 
represent two different situations.  The Oak Ridge network contains some Canadian rail 
lines connected to the U.S. rail system and part of that network are Vancouver and Prince 
Rupert.  We obtain their distances directly from that part of the Oak Ridge network.  
Canadian National Rail connects Prince Rupert while Vancouver has access to Canadian 
National, Canadian Pacific Rail and Union Pacific.  For Lazaro Cardenas, we estimate the 
distance from there to Laredo, Texas (900 miles), where the Kansas City Southern system 
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enters the U.S., and then add the distance from Laredo to the various TAZ destinations.  
We obtain the Mexican distance from http://www.maps-of-mexico.com/driving-distance-
chart.shtml (Virtual Photos and Maps, 1997).  This distance is a highway distance, not a 
rail distance, but is accurate enough for model purposes. 
5. Truck Travel Times 
To estimate travel times by over-the-road truck from U.S. ports to destinations 
(TAZs), we consulted www.skedz.com  (Schedule Distribution Services, LLC , 2008), 
where intermodal train schedules between various origins (domestic ports) and 
destinations (TAZs) can be accessed and compared to estimates of over-the-road truck 
travel times.  The website estimates truck travel times to the nearest tenth of a day.  
Given hours-of-service regulations on drivers, available hours for pick-up and delivery of 
the loads, etc., estimating travel times to a tenth of a day is probably unnecessary, and the 
truck travel times have been approximated (to the nearest one-half day) by the formula: 





t days      
where:  ijd = mileage from origin i to destination j. 
int
300
ijd   
 = largest integer that is less than or equal to the distance 
traveled, divided by half the average travel speed. 
This formula effectively rounds up to the next one-half day, and assumes an 
average travel speed of 600 miles/day.  The results of using this formula compare quite 
well to the estimates quoted on www.skedz.com. 
6. Rail Travel Times 
We find origin-destination intermodal rail schedules at www.skedz.com.  For a 
given O-D pair, there may be different times quoted, based on the time-of-day and day-
of-week when the shipment is tendered.  The times quoted are rail point-to-point times 
(in days), and do not include the drayage at either end of the trip.  We add 24 hours for 
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drayage, and rounded the resulting times up to the next one-half day.  These values 
construct an estimate of the door-to-door time by rail as: 





t days      
where: ijd  = mileage from origin i to destination j. 
int
220
ijd   
 = largest integer that is less than or equal to the distance 
traveled divided by half the average travel speed. 
This formula effectively rounds up to the next one-half day, and assumes an 
average travel speed of 440 miles/day.  Figure 7 below captures the expansive nature of 







Figure 7.   Major lines of the national rail network based on 2008 National 
Transportation Atlas Database.  (From: Association of American Railroads, 
2009)  
7. Rail and Truck Flow Variations 
To estimate container flow from the domestic ports to destinations (TAZs) by rail 
and truck we use the available data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS).  
From the BTS 2007 Preliminary Commodity Flow Survey we used the 2007 table of 
shipment characteristics by Mode of Transportation to determine the percentage of flow 
by mode (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2008).  The table compares both single and 
multiple mode transport.  We use the single-mode 2007 tons shipped on rail and truck to 
determine the ratios.  We remove other single modes the table also includes from our 
computation.  We then normalize the data by taking the sum of the two modes and 
calculating the percent each mode contributes to the sum.  After rounding, we conclude 
that in 2007 rail moved about 18 percent of the tonnage while truck moved about 82 
percent. 
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8. Estimation of Port Capacity 
Port facilities can be viewed using a “pipe” analogy, as shown in Figure 8, which 
is useful to understand delays and capacity.  We can view the various processing steps 
within the port terminal as sections of pipe, with varying sizes representing different 
capacities.  The smallest pipe section dictates the capacity for the terminal as a whole.  It 
may be at any of several places in the facility.  In the example shown in Figure 8, the 
terminal equipment (i.e., the container yard) is the limiting element. 
 
 
Figure 8.   “Pipe” analogy for port facilities (From:  Brennan, 2006) 
The analysis of capacity in a port is on a terminal-by-terminal basis.  The 
“bottleneck” that determines the capacity of a given terminal can be in any of several 
places, but the primary focus here is on two elements—the berth processing of vessels 
and the container yard.  We first discuss the capacity of berths followed by the capacity 
analysis of container yards. 
The expected time required to process a ship (i.e., berth the ship, unload the 
inbound containers, load the outbound containers and have the ship leave the berth) can 
be estimated based on the total number of inbound and outbound TEUs (T), the total 
number of cranes assigned (N), the processing rate (lifts per hour, LPH) of the cranes, the 
fraction of the containers that are 40-foot containers versus 20-foot containers () and the  
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amount of time needed to position the ship at the berth and to move the ship from the 
berth ().  The relationship for expected service time, E[S], expressed in hours, is given in 
equation (C1). 





    
A similar formula is used by both Turner (2000) and Pachakis and Kiremidjian 
(2003).  Equation (C1) assumes that containers are either 20-foot or 40-foot containers. 
More than 90% percent of containers are in these two categories at West Coast ports, 
based on the data assembled by the Pacific Maritime Association  (Pacific Maritime 
Association, 2009), and at Los Angeles 71.3% of containers are in the 40-foot category.  
On the East Coast, the Port of New York and New Jersey reports that from 2000 to 2007 
about 70% of their containers were 40-foot (The Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey, 2009).  Thus, there appears to be relative consistency across ports.  As illustrated 
by equation (C1), this statistic is important because it takes about the same amount of 
time to lift one 20-foot container as to lift one 40-foot container. 
For a given port, we can estimate the TEUs per vessel based on total reported 
TEUs handled and vessel call statistics.  For example, the Port of Houston reported 
handling 2,485,605 TEUs in 2007, and the Maritime Administration reports 818 
container vessel calls in Houston during that year (U.S. Maritime Administration, 2007).  
Thus, we can estimate that the average vessel unloaded and reloaded 3,039 TEUs.  There 
may be some variation among terminals within a port, but we use port averages in the 
absence of better information. 
Terminal statistics on the number of berths available and the number of cranes 
available are relatively easy to obtain, and we can estimate the number of cranes assigned 
(on average) by simply dividing available cranes by available berths.  Gantry cranes may 
perform more than 30 lifts per hour under ideal conditions, but a somewhat smaller 
number (e.g., 25) is more realistic on a sustained basis. 
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We assume that the time required to position the ship at the berth and to move it 
from the berth afterwards is a total of 3 hours.  This is consistent with estimates given by 
Turner (2000). 
Thus, for example, the first phase of Houston’s new Bayport Terminal opened in 
2007, with two berths and four cranes.  Using the port average of 3,039 TEUs to lift per 
vessel, with 64% being 40-foot containers (again, the port average), and 25 lifts/hour 
from the cranes, we would estimate that the expected service time for a vessel at this 
terminal is: 
3039
1.64[ ] 3 40.1 ( )
2 (25)
E S hours   . 
The service time formula is an important determinant of capacity because each 
available berth in the port has an effective capacity of (1/E[S]) during the hours that it 
operates.  The overall effective capacity of the terminal wharf is then related to the 
number of berths (k), the value of E[S], and the working hours per week of the terminal 
(h).  Some terminals operate on a 24/7 basis, but many do not.  For example, if the 
terminal operates 16 hours/day, 6 days/week, the total effective service rate is about 57% 
of the rate that would be achievable with 24/7 operations.  A reasonable estimate of the 






The container yard is the second major piece of the terminal capacity 
determination.  A terminal’s yard acts as a buffer between arrivals and departures.  The 
throughput capacity of the yard (in the sense indicated by the “pipe” diagram in Figure 8) 
is determined by the number of containers that can be stored in the yard at any given time 
and the average dwell time of the containers that pass through the yard.  For example, a 
yard that can hold 10,000 TEUs, and for which the average dwell time is 4 days, can 
sustain an average throughput rate of 2,500 containers per day.  If this throughput rate is 
lower than the rate at which vessels can be unloaded—reloaded at the berths, the terminal 
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is yard-constrained, and the effective processing rate of the berths must be lowered to 
match the yard throughput rate.  This may cause queuing of vessels and increased delay 
time for containers passing through the facility. 
Determining the yard’s sustainable throughput rate (capacity) revolves around 
finding the number of “effective slots” (TEUs) that can be used in the yard, and the 
average dwell time.  The product of those two values yields the capacity.  Container 
terminals typically treat the average dwell time as an exogenous variable—that is, 
determined by factors outside the control of the terminal operator.  Typically, the 
determining factors include the ability to deliver containers locally, or to transfer them to 
rail or over-the-road trucks. 
The number of effective TEU “slots” in the yard is related to the terminal area, the 
container stacking and handling equipment in use, the degree to which the terminal 
operator emphasizes wheeled storage versus grounded storage, etc.  In some cases, 
terminal operators publish the total number of slots in their facility.  For example, at 
Houston’s new Bayport Terminal, the Port of Houston Authority reports availability of 
12,684 total TEU slots in the yard (The Port of Houston Authority, 2008).  In other ports, 
less specific information is available and we make some estimates. 
For example, we estimate total TEU slots the product of total ground slots (TGS) 
and average stack height.  We also estimate TGS, if not reported directly, based on the 
yard size (in acres) and the proportion dedicated to wheeled operations.  Terminal 
operators like wheeled operations (where containers are stored on trailer chasses) because 
this reduces the labor cost of handling containers in the yard.  The containers simply wait 
for the drayage operator to arrive, hook up to the trailer and depart.  However, wheeled 
operations require more area per slot, and preclude stacking.  Thus, the total number of 
TEU slots for wheeled operations is about 75 TEU/acre (Chu and Huang, 2005 and JWD 
Group, 2003).  By contrast, in “grounded” operations, where containers are set directly 
on the ground (not on trailer chassis), the ground slots are typically about 105 TEU/acre 
(Chu and Huang, 2005).  Thus, if a given terminal reports an area of A (acres), and the 
proportion of space allocated for wheeled operations is , the estimated TGS is: 
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 75 105 (1 ) ( ). ( 3)TGS A TEUs C     
Wheeled operations clearly have a height of 1, and grounded operations are 
generally based on a stack height of 3 or 4 (depending on the type of handling equipment 
in use).  It is also common to use a stack height of three for loaded containers and four for 
empties (JWD Group, 2003).  A reasonable assumption is that the average stack height 
for grounded operations is about 3.5, so the average stack height in a yard would be: 
3.5 (1 ) 3.5 2.5 . ( 4)H C        
Thus, given A and , we can estimate total TEU slots in the yard as: 
  75 105 (1 ) 3.5 2.5 ( ). ( 5)TGS H A TEUs C        
Not all of the possible slots in a yard are usable all the time.  Empty slots are 
necessary for moving containers within a stack, and it is necessary to account for 
variations over time.  Dharmalingam (1987), Chu, and Huang (Chu and Huang 2005) 
have suggested values for an “effective utilization” factor of between 0.6 and 0.75, based 
on empirical assessments of operations in different yards.  If no specific information is 
available for a given yard, a reasonable default value is likely to be about 0.7.  Thus, if D 
is the average dwell time (days), we estimate the throughput capacity of a container yard 
(in TEUs/week) as: 
7 (0.7) ( / ). ( 6)y
Total SlotsU TEUs week C
D
  
The total capacity of a specific terminal in the network is the minimum of the 
wharf capacity and the yard capacity: 
 min , . ( 7)term b yU U U C  
If this throughput capacity is lower than the computed capacity of the berths in the 
terminal, the berth capacity should be reduced to the yard capacity, and the expected 
service time for vessels increased accordingly.  This is because the effective rate at which 
vessels can be processed is limited by the terminal’s ability to handle the containers once 
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they come off the ship.  From equation (C2), we do this adjustment by solving for the 
effective service time ˆ[ ]E S , using (C8). 





Because a port will often have more than one terminal, we calculate the capacity 
terminal-by-terminal.  The total port capacity is then the sum of the individual terminal 
capacities.  Table 5 shows the port capacities derived here and used for our model. 
Port Terminals Total Berths
Port Handling 
Capacity      
(TEUs per week)
Baltimore 2 6 120,678               
Charleston 3 10 93,713                 
Houston 2 8 35,355                 
Jacksonville 2 14 53,300                 
Lazaro Cardenas, MX 1 2 14,000                 
Los Angeles/Long Beach 15 75 455,434               
New York/New Jersey 6 30 206,889               
Norfolk 2 12 54,902                 
Oakland 9 26 116,006               
Prince Rupert, BC 1 1 17,808                 
Savannah 1 9 102,770               
Seattle/Tacoma 9 18 160,314               
South Florida 6 17 95,470                 
Vancouver, BC 3 6 51,149                  
Table 5.   Calculated port handling capacities in TEUs per week.  For example, 
Baltimore has 2 terminals and 6 total berths and a calculated port handling 
capacity of 120,678 TEUs per week. 
D. TOTAL TRANSPORTATION COSTS 
The cost measured is in TEU-days it takes all the containers to flow from origin to 
destination.  We use this cost as an aggregate of the total travel time from foreign port to 
domestic destination for imports and from domestic origin to foreign destinations for 
exports.  We show our results in both total transportation days and average days of transit 
per TEU. 
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III. ATTACKER-DEFENDER INTERMODAL MODEL 
A. THE MULTICOMMODITY NETWORK MODEL 
We present an illustrative case study of the major ports, highways and rail lines 
around the country to demonstrate how they can be modeled as a system, with system 
users, using the notation introduced above in Chapter II.  Suppose we are worried that 
terrorists might attack and deny access to one or more of these ports and or TAZs.  How 
do we value these nodes (ports or TAZs)?  Moreover, given that intelligent terrorists will 
surely observe our defensive preparations, which nodes should be defended? 
Ports, roads and rail are built to convey goods, and in our case container traffic, so 
we model this traffic to mimic the function of the major ports, highways and rail lines.  
For this particular system, there is no overarching system operator, but we anticipate that 
transportation system users —shippers, international shipping lines, port authorities and 
terminal operators, rail carriers, trucking companies, etc.—will behave via Adam Smith’s 
“invisible hand” to choose the ports, traverse the roads and rail in the United States in an 
optimal manner.  Inside the United States, we construct a network of 98 nodes 
(representing 14 ports and 84 cities), each of which is connected to others by one or more 
arcs (representing a road or rail connection). 
We assume that the function of this system is to permit containers (measured in 
TEUs) to move from their place of origin (foreign port for imports or domestic city 
[TAZ] for exports) to their destination (domestic city [TAZ] for imports or foreign port 
for exports).  Accordingly, we model the demand for container flow between each 
domestic port and TAZ pair, with specific demands given in Appendix A for imports and 
Appendix B for exports. 
B. THE OPERATOR’S PROBLEM 
The operator’s problem is to route all container traffic over the network in a 
manner that satisfies all supplies, demands, and capacities, and that incurs the lowest total 
transportation cost in TEU-days.  Here, we seek the optimal operation of the system 
given that roads and rail lines have varying capacities and costs.  We measure transit cost 
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per container in days traversed.  We allow a container to “fly to the destination” if the 
cost to let it reach its destination becomes prohibitively high, and we assume the penalty 
cost of this is ten times the largest transportation cost in the network.  In this case, we say 
that the container has been “dropped.”  Thus, for any set of container flows in the 
network, we have (total system cost) = (total transit cost) + (total drop penalty cost). 
The total system cost is the sum of the operating costs in TEU travel days. 
For any particular set of interdicted arcs, denoted Xˆ , we formally state the 
operator’s system operation problem ˆ( )OPERATOR X as follows: 
Index use [~cardinality] 
n N   nodes, an ordinal set (alias i,j,p,q) [~144] 
( , )i j A    directed arcs [~5656] 
m M  transport mode (alias mm) [~3] 
Given data [units] 
nqb  Supply ( 0 ) or demand (<0) originating from n destined  
for q [TEUs per week]  , 0,
i N
i qb q N

    
ijmc  Cost to traverse arc ( , )i j A  on mode m [days] 
ncap  Container handling capacity of node n [TEUs per week] 
,ijm ijmf f  minimum, maximum fraction of flow on directed arc ( , )i j A  that can use 
mode m [fraction] 
ijmu  Upper bound on container flow over directed arc ( , )i j A  using mode m [TEUs 
per week] 
ijq  Incremental delay to traverse an interdicted arc ( , )i j A  [days per TEU] 
nqwc  Penalty cost of dropping demand at q originating from n [days per TEU] 
ˆ
ijX  1 if arc ( , )i j A  has been interdicted, 0 otherwise [binary] 
Decision variables [units] 
ijmqY  Flow on arc ( , )i j A  of mode m traffic bound for node q in days [TEUs] 
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Given an interdiction Xˆ , this problem solves for the optimal container flows Y (on 
each arc) along with any dropped container traffic W.  The objective (D0) assesses the 
total cost of container movement in days, including a cost penalty for each interdicted arc 
that delays flow there, and a penalty cost (in days) for any dropped demand.  Each 
constraint (D1) enforces conservation of flow at node n for traffic destined for node q.  
Each constraint (D2) limits the minimum fraction of flow on a particular arc using a 
particular mode, while each (D3) limits the maximum fraction.  Each constraint (D4) 
limits non-negative container flow on an arc for some a mode.  Each constraint (D5) 
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limits the inbound traffic to a node, and each (D6) limits outbound traffic from each 
node.  (D7) specifies non-negative dropped flows.  
The primary input data for this model are the container demands, nqb , the costs of 
traversing each segment by mode, ijmc , and the capacities of the road or rail segments in 
each arc, ijmu .  The parameter nqwc  is the “penalty cost” associated with a container 
being directly shipped from its origin n to its destination q instead of traveling to its 
destination via truck or rail because the system does not have the capacity to allow it to 
get there, which is signaled when it is too costly for the container to do so. 
In the original operator’s problem, no node and therefore no arc is interdicted: 
ˆ 0, ( , )ijX i j A   .  In the absence of interdiction, the operator may use any of the roads 
or rail lines to convey container traffic.  The minimum-cost solution for a single week’s 
TEU demand incurs 11,703,835 days of transit cost (14.72 transit days per TEU) and 
there is no dropped flow or penalty. 
We can think of container flow for each O-D pair as a different commodity that 
competes for network resources (here, ship, road, and rail capacity).  The size of such 
multi-commodity flow problems can be large, because the number of O-D pairs grows 
quadratically with the number of cities, and the number of potential paths for each 
commodity grows exponentially in the size of the network.  For this case study, the 
operator’s problem has 144 nodes, 3,640 arcs, and 3,253 commodities, yielding a grand 
total of just over 28 thousand constraints and 835 thousand variables.  Demands total just 
over 795,300 TEU containers, each of which may follow a different route.  Despite its 
size, we can solve this multi-commodity flow problem easily—using commercial 
optimization software, we can build and solve this operator’s problem in a few seconds. 
C. THE ATTACKER’S PROBLEM 
To identify the worst-case disruption to an infrastructure, we consider the 
perspective of an intelligent adversary who can mount one or more simultaneous attacks 
on infrastructure components (here, the nodes in the network).  We assume that these 
attacks are binary (i.e., no partial attacks) and that the attacker is limited by a maximum 
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number of such attacks.  We build a detailed mathematical program for determining the 
most disruptive attacks; the resulting two-sided (Attacker-Defender) optimization is 
stated as ATTACKER: 
Additional data [units] 
Yˆ  container flows [TEUs] 
Wˆ  dropped container flows [TEUs] 




q N n N
wc W
   [TEU days] 
attacks  maximum number of node attacks [cardinality] 
Additional decision variables [units]  
nQ  1 if node n attacked, 0 otherwise [binary] 
ijX  1 if arc ( , )i j A  interdicted, 0 otherwise [binary] 
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Formulation ATTACKER: 
,, ( , ) , ,
,
* max min ( ) (A0)
s.t. (D1) (D7) and
(A1)
( , ) (A2)
{0,1} (A3)
{0,1} ( , ) (A4)
ijmqY WQ X
n
nq nqijm ij ij
i j A n N
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The objective (A0) measures the total transit cost (in TEU days, including penalty 
delays for traversing “interdicted” arcs) and the total penalty delays for “dropped” flow.  
Constraint (A1) limits the number of nodes that can be attacked.  Constraints (A2) 
determine which arcs are interdicted by node attacks.  Stipulations (A3-A4) define 
variable domains. This formulation conforms to the structure found in Brown et al. 
(2006) and cannot be solved with conventional optimization methods.  We could also 
enumerate all possible attacks, and solve the resulting restricted linear programs, but this 
is impractical for problems of any reasonable size.  For example, enumerating all possible 
3-node attacks generates 
144
3
    = 487,344 attack plans, each of which requires solving 
for the operator’s best response. 
D. SOLVING THE INTERMODAL MODEL VIA DECOMPOSITION 
For any single, fixed set of operator flows,Yˆ , and the resulting dropped demands, 
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We decompose ATTACKER by replacing inequality (A5) with a set of 
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Call any solution X  satisfying constraints (A1) and (A2) “admissible.” 
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The complete decomposition algorithm is as follows: 
 
In our test cases, we use a maximum of 30 iterations and relative convergence 
tolerance 0.01  . 
 
Algorithm DECOMPOSITION  
Input: Data for attacker’s problem, relative optimality tolerance 0  ; 
Output: ρ-optimal interdiction plan *X , and responding defender plan *Y ; 
1. Initialize best lower bound LBZ  , best upper bound UBZ  , 
define the incumbent, null attack plan 1ˆ X 0  as the best found so far, and 
set iteration counter K ← 1; 
2. Subproblem: Solve subproblem KOPERATOR(X )  to determine the 
optimal operator’s responding transportation plan ˆ KY  given attack plan 
ˆ KX ; the bound on the associated objective is min ˆ( )
KZ X ; 
3. If K=1 and 1Xˆ  not admissible, go to step (6) (Master Problem); 
4. If min
ˆ( )KLBZ Z X  set min ˆ( )KLBZ Z X  and record improved incumbent 
 attack plan * ˆ KX X , and responding defender plan * ˆ KY Y ; 
5. If ( 9/ max(10 , )LBUB LBZ Z Z    ) go to End; 
6. Master Problem:  Given defender plans ˆ kY , k=1,…K, attempt to solve 
master problem ˆATTACKER(Y)  to determine an optimal attacker plan 
1ˆ KX .  The bound on the associated objective is max ˆ( )Z Y  
7. If  max ˆ( )UBZ Z Y  set max ˆ( )UBZ Z Y ; 
8. If  ( 9/ max(10 , )LBUB LBZ Z Z    ) go to End; 
9. Set K ← K +1 and go to step (2) (Subproblem); 
10. End:  Print, “ *X   is an ρ-optimal attack plan, and *Y  is the operator 
response to that plan,” and halt. 
For the sake of efficiency, one need not store incumbent operation plans *Y  in step 4. 
These can quickly be recovered after-the-fact by solving *( )OPERATOR X . 
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IV. SCENARIO AND RESULTS 
A. BASELINE MODEL–NORMAL OPERATIONS 
The primary purpose of our model is to provide a capability to assess the 
economic impacts on import and export container flows of various types of disruptions to 
ports or to the U.S. domestic transportation system (rail or truck).  These costs are what 
decision makers will consider when deciding which infrastructure components to defend 
or fortify in order to protect the value of the system.  To illustrate this capability, five 
types of possible disruptions are considered.  These five examples are certainly not 
exhaustive of the model’s capabilities, but they illustrate types of analyses the model will 
support. 
1. Scenario 
We first model the U.S. container transportation system with one week of import 
and export demand to establish the baseline costs to which we may compare abnormal 
scenarios.  The baseline model represents the 46 foreign seaports, 14 seaports and 84 
Transportation Analysis Zones introduced in Chapter II.  Specific O-D pair demands are 
located in Appendix A (imports) and Appendix B (exports). 
2. Results 
Under normal conditions, the total cost of transporting one week of import and 
export demand (795,306 TEUs) is 11,786,605 TEU-days of transit cost or 14.82 transit 
days per TEU.  While we cannot fully illustrate the individual routes followed between 
each Origin-Destination (O-D) pair under normal operations, we do show a sample 
detailing the demand, commodity flows and total costs for imports destined for Albany, 
NY.  Table 6 shows the import demand data for the Albany, NY TAZ.  Table 7 displays 
the routes (arcs by mode) chosen by the operator to meet the demand destined for 
Albany, NY TAZ. 
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BELGIUM Albany, NY 37
BRAZIL Albany, NY 80
CHINA MAINLAND Albany, NY 765
CHINA TAIWAN Albany, NY 76
FRANCE Albany, NY 38
GERMANY Albany, NY 98
HONG KONG Albany, NY 146
INDIA Albany, NY 49
INDONESIA Albany, NY 38
ITALY Albany, NY 91
JAPAN Albany, NY 95
MALAYSIA Albany, NY 37
NETHERLANDS Albany, NY 47
SOUTH KOREA Albany, NY 65
THAILAND Albany, NY 55






Table 6.   Import demand data for Albany, NY TAZ. 






BELGIUM NorfolkPort Ship 37 8 296
BRAZIL NorfolkPort Ship 80 11 880
FRANCE NorfolkPort Ship 38 7 266
GERMANY NorfolkPort Ship 98 8 784
INDIA NorfolkPort Ship 49 19 931
NETHERLANDS NorfolkPort Ship 47 8 376
NorfolkPort AlbanyNY Truck 286 1 143
NorfolkPort AlbanyNY Rail 63 3 157
ITALY NYNJPort Ship 91 9 819
UNITEDKINGDOM NYNJPort Ship 41 7 287
NYNJPort AlbanyNY Rail 132 2 198
INDONESIA OaklandPort Ship 38 16 608
OaklandPort AlbanyNY Truck 31 6 187
OaklandPort AlbanyNY Rail 7 8 55
CHINAMNLND SeaTacPort Ship 765 11 8415
CHINATAIWAN SeaTacPort Ship 76 12 912
HONGKONG SeaTacPort Ship 146 12 1752
JAPAN SeaTacPort Ship 95 9 855
MALAYSIA SeaTacPort Ship 37 15 555
SOUTHKOREA SeaTacPort Ship 65 10 650
THAILAND SeaTacPort Ship 55 15 825
SeaTacPort AlbanyNY Truck 1016 6 6096
SeaTacPort AlbanyNY Rail 223 8 1784  
Table 7.   Operator plans these minimum-cost TEU flows to Albany, NY. 
Under normal conditions, in which containers bound for U.S. destinations select 
the port from the least expensive path to a TAZ, ports exhibit relatively low utilization 
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indicative of sufficient capacity, shown in Table 8.  “TEUs (Imports and Exports)” in 
Table 8 is the number of TEUs the model chooses to send through each port to meet 
demand at minimum cost and “Percent of Total TEUs” is the TEUs handled by each port 
as a percentage of the 795,306 TEUs shipped in the model.  “TEU Port Handling 
Capacity” is the sum of the individual terminal capacities and average TEUs handled by 
each port in 2007.  Chapter II derives these capacities.  “Percent of TEU Port Handling 
Capacity” is the number of TEUs handled divided by each port’s TEU handling capacity. 








Percent of TEU 
Port Handling 
Capacity  
Baltimore 27,371                     3.44% 120,678    22.68%
Charleston 15,805                     1.99% 93,713      16.87%
Houston 20,178                     2.54% 35,355      57.07%
Jacksonville 7,369                       0.93% 53,300      13.83%
Lazaro Cardenas, MX 301                          0.04% 14,000      2.15%
Los Angeles/Long Beach 270,870                   34.06% 455,434    59.48%
New York/New Jersey 55,062                     6.92% 206,889    26.61%
Norfolk  54,217                     6.82% 54,902      98.75%
Oakland 110,079                   13.84% 116,006    94.89%
Prince Rupert, BC 5,060                       0.64% 17,808      28.41%
Savannah 3,215                       0.40% 102,770    3.13%
Seattle/Tacoma 160,314                   20.16% 160,314    100.00%
South Florida 14,316                     1.80% 95,470      15.00%
Vancouver, BC 51,149                     6.43% 51,149      100.00%  
Table 8.   Baseline case showing optimal number of TEUs handled and percent of 
TEU port handling capacity of domestic ports when handling one week of 
TEU demand.  For example, Baltimore handles 27,371 TEUs, which is 
3.44% of total demand and 22.68% of its 120,678 TEU handling capacity. 
B. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE 
1. Scenario 
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) recently released a report (“The 
ShakeOut Scenario”) assessing the impacts of a postulated 7.8 magnitude earthquake 
along the San Andreas Fault in the Los Angeles area (Jones, et al., 2008).  Among many 
conclusions regarding the impact of such an earthquake on the infrastructure in the Los 
Angeles area, the report estimates that while the port facilities in Los Angeles and Long 
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Beach would  likely sustain only minor damage, the ports are likely to be closed for a 
period ranging from two weeks to two months as a result of damage to the highway, rail 
and pipeline facilities that connect them to the surrounding region and the nation at large.  
We represent this scenario by forcing the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach closed.  
The remaining 13 ports remain operational. 
LA-LB is the primary gateway to the U.S. for containerized cargo from Asia.  
More than 84% of all containers imported through LA-LB originate in eight countries, as 




















Figure 9.   Originating container country as a percent of total TEUs handled by the 
Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (After: Port of Long Beach, 2007). 
Over 70% of this cargo is destined for points outside of Southern California 
(Orange County Transportation Authority, 2009).  For imports moving by rail or truck to 
destinations further east, other Pacific Coast ports (including ports in Canada and 
Mexico) are viable alternatives. 
2. Results 
The purpose of this scenario is to assess the impacts to other ports during a TSI, in 
this case a 7.8 magnitude earthquake, where the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 
(LA-LB) close for a period of two weeks. 
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After closing down the port of LA-LB, the model uses the other Pacific Coast 
ports to deliver the TEUs to the U.S.  Table 9 shows operator plans directing TEUs after 
LA-LB is shutdown.  Several ports, including the remaining operational ports in the 
Pacific (Prince Rupert, Vancouver, SeaTac, Oakland, and Lazaro Cardenas) and some on 
the Atlantic coast (Houston and New York-New Jersey), are now handling 100% of their 
TEUs capacity.  The “Percentage Increase” by the each port is in comparison to the result 
from the baseline model, as shown in Table 8.  Although not to full TEU capacity, the 
remaining ports also show a significant increase in TEU traffic.  Surprisingly, loss of LA-
LB leads to Baltimore, Charleston, Jacksonville and South Florida increasing throughputs 
by 59%, 33%, 29% and 62%, respectively. 
Port TEUs Handled 
(LA-LB closed)
Percent of Port 
TEU Handling 
Capacity       
(LA-LB closed)
Percent of Port 
TEU Handling 






Baltimore 98,916             81.97% 22.68% 59.29%
Charleston 47,031             50.19% 16.87% 33.32%
Houston 35,355             100.00% 57.07% 42.93%
Jacksonville 22,877             42.92% 13.83% 29.10%
Lazaro Cardenas, MX 14,000             100.00% 2.15% 97.85%
Los Angeles/Long Beach -                   0.00% 59.48% -59.48%
New York/New Jersey 84,342             40.77% 26.61% 14.15%
Norfolk 54,902             100.00% 98.75% 1.25%
Oakland 116,006           100.00% 94.89% 5.11%
Prince Rupert, BC 17,808             100.00% 28.41% 71.59%
Savannah 17,918             17.44% 3.13% 14.31%
Seattle/Tacoma 160,314           100.00% 100.00% 0.00%
South Florida 74,209             77.73% 15.00% 62.73%
Vancouver, BC 51,149             100.00% 100.00% 0.00%  
Table 9.   Operator plans for port usage after LA-LB is shutdown.  For example, 
Oakland handles 116,006 TEUs or 100% of its TEU handling capacity.  
With LA-LB open, Oakland handles 94.89% of its capacity.  The closure of 
LA-LB increases Oakland’s port capacity usage by 5.11%. 
Our model calculates the total days of transit cost from origin to destination the 
demand (795,306 TEUs) requires.  As illustrated in Figure 10, the closure of LA-LB 
increases transit costs by 14.75%.  This translates to an increase of just over 2 days per 
















































Effects on Transportation Costs with Closure of     
LA-LB Ports
Baseline Cost Closure Cost
14.75% increase 
of average days 
per TEU
 
Figure 10.   Additional transportation costs due to closure of ports of LA-LB for 14 
days. 
This shows how a 14-day closure of the ports at Los Angeles and Long Beach 
creates waves through the freight transportation system that are felt not only at other U.S. 
Pacific Coast ports, but also at East Coast ports.  In addition, this event would affect the 
U.S. rail and truck industries, the ports in Canada and Mexico, as well as vessel owners 
and shipping lines, who would have to re-orient their operations over the period of 
recovery.  The large increase in use of Atlantic Coast ports for traffic from Asian origins 
means a substantial increase in vessel traffic through the Panama Canal creating 
congestion and delays. 
C. LOCKOUT BY THE INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN AND 
WAREHOUSEMEN’S UNION (ILWU) 
1. Scenario 
In September 2002, the Pacific Maritime Association Board of Directors, 
representing 72 ocean cargo carriers, terminal operators, and stevedoring companies of 
the West Coast shipping industry, locked longshoremen, dockworkers, and marine clerks 
out of terminals in retaliation for an intentional slowdown of labor by the ILWU (Pacific 
Maritime Association, 2002).  The lockout closed West Coast seaports from San Diego to 
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the Canadian border.  We represent this scenario by closing the U.S. West Coast ports 
while the three West Coast non-U.S. ports remain operational (Vancouver, Prince Rupert, 
and Lazaro Cardenas). 
2. Results 
Our analysis reveals that shutting down the ports of LA-LB, Oakland, and SeaTac 
for 14 days will increase transportation costs dramatically.  Table 10 shows the schedule 
of worst-case closures and resulting additional transportation days to deliver all 795,306 
TEUs. 
Number of Port 
Closures






0 No attacks (baseline) 11,786,605   n/a 14.82                 
1 LALB Port         13,524,784   1,738,179 17.01                 
2 LALB Port and SeaTac Port                15,170,491   1,645,707 19.08                 
3 LALB Port, Oakland Port and SeaTac Port      16,963,772   1,793,281 21.33                  
Table 10.   Schedule of worst-case closures of U.S. West Coast ports and their 
consequences.  For example, closing LA-LB, Oakland, and Seattle-Tacoma 
will cost 16,963,772 days to transport all TEUs to their destination, an 
increase of 1,793,281 days over the worst-case 2-node closure of LA-LB 
and Seattle-Tacoma.  The closure results in an average cost of 21.33 days 
per TEU, an increase of 6.51 days over the baseline cost of 14.82 days. 
We observe that the worst-case 1-node shutdown is the Port of Los Angeles-Long 
Beach.  That is, losing this port is more costly to the system than the loss of any of the 
other two options.  The optimal 2-node shutdown closes the ports of Los Angeles-Long 
Beach and Seattle-Tacoma.  The worst-case 3-node shutdowns are the ports of Los 
Angeles-Long Beach, Oakland and Seattle-Tacoma.  The two- and three-node shutdowns 
are monotonic, in the sense that each includes all the nodes shut down previously, plus 
one additional node. 
The total cost of shutting down the ports LA-LB, Oakland and Seattle-Tacoma by 
the ILWU Board of Directors for 14 days would increase total shipping costs by an 
additional 5,177,167 days or as Figure 11 illustrates, the lockout results in an additional 
6.5 days of delays per TEU.  An increase of 43.92% in transportation costs from 14.82 to 











































Effects on Transportation Costs by ILWU Lockout Resulting 
in Closure of  LA-LB, Oakland and SeaTac Ports
Baseline Cost Closure Cost
43.92% increase 
of average days 
per TEU
 
Figure 11.   Additional transportation costs due to ILWU lockout for 14 days. 
A closure of this magnitude will affect many other ports.  As shown in Table 11, 
all the other ports in the model, with the exception of New York-New Jersey, will be 
working at 100% capacity.  Although not at capacity, the port of New York-New Jersey 
increases TEU throughput by 45.23% over the baseline number of TEUs handled.  While 
we cannot fully demonstrate the individual transportation costs the model calculates to 
determine the minimum transportation cost routes in this scenario, we can see that the 
port of New York-New Jersey is the port, in this model, furthest for Asian markets, which 
are the major trading partners of the West Coast ports.  This might explain the reason all 
East Coast ports are at capacity, while New York±New Jersey is the only port with 
remaining available capacity. 
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Port TEUs Handled 
(ILWU Lockout)
Percent of Port 
TEU Handling 
Capacity       
(ILWU Lockout)
Percent of Port 
TEU Handling 
Capacity        
(Baseline)
Percentage 
Increase in Port 
Usage        
(ILWU Lockout)
Baltimore 120,678              100.00% 22.68% 77.32%
Charleston 93,713                100.00% 16.87% 83.13%
Houston 35,355                100.00% 57.07% 42.93%
Jacksonville 53,300                100.00% 13.83% 86.17%
Lazaro Cardenas, MX 14,000                100.00% 2.15% 97.85%
Los Angeles/Long Beach -                     0.00% 59.48% -59.48%
New York/New Jersey 148,635              71.84% 26.61% 45.23%
Norfolk 54,902                100.00% 98.75% 1.25%
Oakland 2,382                  2.05% 94.89% -92.84%
Prince Rupert, BC 17,808                100.00% 28.41% 71.59%
Savannah 102,770              100.00% 3.13% 96.87%
Seattle/Tacoma 5,144                  3.21% 100.00% -96.79%
South Florida 95,470                100.00% 15.00% 85.00%
Vancouver, BC 51,149                100.00% 100.00% 0.00%  
Table 11.   Resulting TEU port flows during the ILWU lockout.  For example, 
Charleston handles 93,713 TEUs during the lockout, which pushes it to 
83.13% above its normal usage.  It is handling 100% of its capacity vice 
16.87% it normally handles.  
Although closed during the ILWU lockout, the ports of Oakland and Seattle-
Tacoma handle 2,382 and 5,144 TEUs, respectively.  After a disruption in the 
transportation network, in this case the lockout, our model allows the operator to decide 
the least costly solution to the multi-commodity flow transportation problem.  In this 
case, the operator finds it less expensive to let these small numbers of TEUs be frustrated 
in route for 14 days than to re-route them through other ports (i.e., New York±New 
Jersey). 
In this scenario, Oakland handles both import and export TEUs while Seattle-
Tacoma only handles exports.  Table 12 illustrates the origin-destination pairs and mode 
of transportation of the 2,382 import and export TEUs handled by Oakland during the 
ILWU lockout.  Table 13 illustrates the origin-destination pairs and mode of 





Mode to Port of 
Oakland
TEUs
HONGKONG BillingsMT Ship 99
CHINAMNLND BoiseCityID Ship 1432
CHINATAIWAN BoiseCityID Ship 142
HONGKONG BoiseCityID Ship 260
JAPAN BoiseCityID Ship 196
SOUTHKOREA BoiseCityID Ship 125
DallasTX ELSALVADOR Rail 9
DallasTX ELSALVADOR Truck 43
BillingsMT HONGKONG Rail 14
BillingsMT HONGKONG Truck 62
Total TEUs 2382  
Table 12.   Origin-Destination pairs of TEUs handled by port of Oakland despite its 14-
day ILWU lockout. 
Origin Destination
Transportation 
Mode to Port of 
Seattle/Tacoma
TEUs
PhoenixAZ CHINAMNLND Truck 2819
PhoenixAZ CHINAMNLND Rail 926
PhoenixAZ CHINATAIWAN Truck 294
PhoenixAZ HONGKONG Truck 412
PhoenixAZ JAPAN Truck 420
PhoenixAZ SOUTHKOREA Truck 273
5144Total TEUs  
Table 13.   Origin-Destination pairs of TEUs handled by port of Seattle-Tacoma despite 





D. HURRICANE CLOSES THE PORTS OF SAVANNAH, GA AND 
CHARLESTON, SC 
1. Scenario 
The 14-modeled ports serve a vital role in international commerce, managing over 
90 percent of total containerized traffic entering or leaving the U.S. (American 
Association of Port Authorities, 2009).  A direct hit by a hurricane on one of these 
seaports could cripple its home state’s economic engines and have a ripple effect across 
the country. 
We present this scenario as another capability of this model with multiple 
simultaneous disruptions, in this case by a hurricane.  The hurricane affects the 
approximately 90 miles of coastline between the ports of Savannah, GA and Charleston, 
SC and consequently forces them closed. 
2. Results 
The purpose of this scenario is to assess the impacts to other ports during a 
hurricane that closes the ports of Savannah, GA and Charleston, SC.  The total 
transportation cost due to the hurricane is 11,791,678 transportation days.  This reveals an 
increase of 5,073 days or 0.64% in costs over the baseline model.  Figure 12 illustrates 
the small difference in average days per TEU as other ports in the area can absorb the 














































Effects on Transportation Costs by Closing the Ports of 
Savannah and Charleston
Baseline Cost Closure Cost
0.64% increase of 
average days per 
TEU
 
Figure 12.   Additional transportation costs due to a 14-day closure of the Ports of 
Savannah, GA and Charleston, SC. 
In the baseline model, Savannah and Charleston handle 19,020 (2.44%) of the 
795,306 TEUs in the model.  After the hurricane shuts down the two ports, the operator 
must decide the optimal network flow that will minimize the total transportation costs.  
As shown in Table 14, the operator plans to shift the TEUs to the ports of Baltimore, 
Houston, Jacksonville, and South Florida.  Oakland now handles 1.33% more of its 








Percent of Port TEU 
Handling Capacity   
(Charleston and 
Savannah closed)
Percent of Port 
TEU Handling 








in Port Usage       
(Charleston and 
Savannah closed)
Baltimore 38,357           31.78% 22.68% 10,985                9.10%
Charleston -                 0.00% 16.87% (15,805)               -16.87%
Houston 20,447           57.83% 57.07% 269                     0.76%
Jacksonville 12,347           23.17% 13.83% 4,978                  9.34%
Los Angeles/Long Beach 269,348         59.14% 59.48% (1,522)                 -0.33%
Lazaro Cardenas, MX 301                2.15% 2.15% -                      0.00%
New York/New Jersey 54,902           26.54% 26.61% (160)                    -0.08%
Norfolk 54,410           99.10% 98.75% 194                     0.35%
Oakland 111,621         96.22% 94.89% 1,542                  1.33%
Prince Rupert, BC 5,060             28.41% 28.41% -                      0.00%
Savannah -                 0.00% 3.13% (3,215)                 -3.13%
Seattle/Tacoma 160,314         100.00% 100.00% -                      0.00%
South Florida 17,050           17.86% 15.00% 2,734                  2.86%
Vancouver, BC 51,149           100.00% 100.00% -                      0.00%  
Table 14.   Operator plans when a hurricane shuts down the ports of Savannah and 
Charleston.  For example, Jacksonville handles 12,347 TEUs during the 
lockout, which is 9.34% above its normal capacity usage.  With the 
additional 4,978 TEUs, it is handling 23.17% of its capacity vice the 13.83% 
it normally handles. 
E. REDUCED CAPACITY AT PORT OF OAKLAND DUE TO INCREASED 
SECURITY MEASURES 
1. Scenario 
Increased security measures have the potential to reduce a port’s import 
processing rate, and thereby decrease the port’s capacity, affecting exports and increasing 
delays for shippers.  Container inspections are carried out either while containers are 
waiting in the container yard for pick-up or after loading on trucks or trains for departure 
from the port (Deparment of Homeland Security, 2006).  This is, at least in part, an effort 
to minimize the impact on port processing and prevent additional delays.  However, 
increasingly stringent efforts at inspection and prevention of contraband material from 
entering the U.S. will result in decreases in the TEU processing rate of ports.  In this case, 
we have postulated a 30-percent decrease in the rate at which vessels are unloaded at the 
dock due to increased inspections before containers are allowed out of the container yard 
and into the U.S.  The reduced capacity is limited to the Port of Oakland to see the 
diversions of container traffic that occur as a direct result of the reduced capacity. 
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2. Results 
Our results reveal diversions of imports from Asia through Los Angeles and Long 
Beach as well as some East Coast.  This is a direct result of both Seattle-Tacoma and 
Vancouver already operating at capacity in the baseline case.  Although the Panama 
Canal capacity is not reflected in our model, these diversions will increase flow through 
the Panama Canal and potentially cause an additional bottleneck. 
The total transportation cost due to a reduced capacity in Oakland is 11,791,678 
transportation days, an increase of 4,211 days or 0.53% in costs over the baseline model.  
Figure 13 illustrates the small difference in average days per TEU as other regional ports 













































Effects on Transportation Costs by a 30% Reduction in 
Port Handling Capacity due to Increased Security 
Measures at Port of Oakland
Baseline Cost Closure Cost
0.53% increase of 
average days per 
TEU
 
Figure 13.   Additional transportation costs due to increased security measures at the 
Port of Oakland. 
Table 15 summarizes the flow through the ports as they compare to the baseline 
results (Table 8).  The major increase in traffic is at Los Angeles and Long Beach, which 
handles an additional 28,184 TEUs; the majority of the 28,875 TEUs Oakland cannot 
handle.  The port of Prince Rupert absorbs 493 of the remaining TEUs previously 


























TEU  Port 
Handling 
Capacity
Baltimore 26,048         21.58% 22.68% -1,324 -1.10%
Charleston 17,943         19.15% 16.87% 2,138 2.28%
Houston 19,690         55.69% 57.07% -488 -1.38%
Jacksonville 6,947           13.03% 13.83% -422 -0.80%
Lazaro Cardenas, MX 301              2.15% 2.15% 0 0.00%
Los Angeles/Long Beach 299,054       65.66% 59.48% 28,184 6.18%
New York/New Jersey 53,904         26.05% 26.61% -1,158 -0.56%
Norfolk  54,902         100.00% 98.75% 685 1.25%
Oakland 81,204         100.00% 94.89% -28,875 5.11%
Prince Rupert, BC 5,553           31.18% 28.41% 493 2.77%
Savannah 3,468           3.37% 3.13% 253 0.24%
Seattle/Tacoma 160,314       100.00% 100.00% 0 0.00%
South Florida 14,830         15.53% 15.00% 513 0.53%
Vancouver, BC 51,149         100.00% 100.00% 0 0.00%  
Table 15.   Operator plans in response to a 30% capacity reduction in the port of 
Oakland.  For example, LA-LB handles 299,054 TEUs, an increase of 
28,184 TEUs over the baseline.  This translates to a 6.18% increase over 
normal TEU handling levels; a total of 65.66% of its total TEU handling 
capacity. 
The reduced capacity at Oakland (81,204 TEUs/week) is completely used, as is 
the available capacity at Vancouver.  The result of a 30% reduction in the port of 
Oakland directly increases the traffic on many ports, an increase that many will not be 
able to support.  The results of similar policies implemented at other ports without first 
expanding capacity will be at a much higher cost. 
 
F. AN INTELLIGENT TERRORIST ATTACKS THE UNITED STATES 
CONTAINER INTERMODAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
1. Scenario 
Our model allows us to close or “attack” a port or TAZ and this causes incident 
arcs, highway or rail lines, to be “interdicted.”  An intelligent terrorist, with enough 
resources, can also deliver an attack on the same components of the container 
transportation system.  The key piece of intelligence is where an intelligent terrorist will 
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strike.  In order to get an insight into the most desirable targets to an intelligent terrorist 
we allow the model to attack either port or TAZ nodes. 
2. Results 
Our findings reveal the impact of an attack that results in the shutdown of any 
port or TAZ centroid city where all incident arcs are “interdicted.”  Our model provides a 
way to extract the impact as the incremental transportation costs (days) associated with a 
TSI modeled as an attack on single or multiple nodes (ports or TAZs). 
We present our results in Table 16.  The optimal 1-node attack is the port of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach.  This is not unexpected as LA-LB has the most capacity and 
thus has the potential for the most disruption in TEU traffic flow throughout the 
transportation system.  As shown in Table 16, the average increase in cost from no 
attacks to one attack is 2.19 days/TEU but when two attacks occur, we only get an 
increase of 2.07 days/TEU over the one-attack costs.  This is the best the attacker, or 
“terrorist,” can do with two-attacks.  This is where the convergence tolerance () of 1%, 














0 No attacks (baseline) 11,786,605 n/a 14.82               n/a
1 Los Angeles and Long Beach Port         13,524,784 1,738,179       17.01               2.19                  
2 Optimal 1-node attack and SeaTac Port 15,174,532 1,649,748       19.08               2.07                  
3 Optimal 2-node attack and Oakland Port 16,964,985 1,790,453       21.33               2.25                  
4 Optimal 3-node attack and NY-NJ Port 18,595,900 1,630,915       23.38               2.05                  
5 Optimal 4-node attack and Baltimore Port 21,085,230 2,489,330       26.51               3.13                   
Table 16.   Schedule of worst-case attacks on U.S. container transportation system and 
resultant transportation costs.  For example, with four nodes attacked (Ports 
of LA-LB, SeaTac, Oakland and NY-NJ) the total cost is 18,595,900 days.  
This is an increase of 1,630,915 days, or 2.05 days/TEU, over the worst-case 
3-node attack, for a total of 23.38 days/TEU. 
Although LA-LB is the top choice of an intelligent terrorist, the model does 
consider other options.  Table 17 illustrates the other top choices and resultant 
transportation costs for a 1-node attack plan.  We observe that that the second-best 1-
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node attack plan is not a port at all but the New York Transportation Analysis Zone.  In 
fact, all other best 1-node attacks are TAZs. 
Worst-case 1-node attacks Total Cost 
(days)




No attacks (baseline) 11,786,605 n/a 14.82
Los Angeles and Long Beach Port  13,524,784 1,738,179                 17.01
NewYork, NY TAZ          13,106,244 1,319,639                 16.48
Los Angeles, CA TAZ        12,650,674 864,069                    15.91
San Jose, CA TAZ          12,273,278 486,673                    15.43
Chicago, IL TAZ           12,306,201 519,596                    15.47  
Table 17.   Worst-case 1-node attack plans on the commercial container transportation 
system.  For example, the fifth worst-case 1-node attack would be on the 
Chicago, IL Transportation Analysis Zone because it would result in a 
transportation cost increase of 519,596 days over the baseline cost.  The 
total cost is 12,306,201 which translates to an average of 15.47 transit days 
per TEU. 
We show the change from baseline conditions in TEU port handling capacity by 
each port with a 4-node optimal attack in Table 18.  After a 4-node worst-case attack 
every unaffected port is at 100% capacity in order to handle the 795,306 TEUs of demand 
in the model.  The operator finds the optimal solution is to “wait out” the four-port (LA-
LB, New York-New Jersey, Seattle-Tacoma, and Oakland) closure and pay the additional 
transportation penalty cost of 14 days per TEU because it has no available capacity 
anywhere else.  In a sense, the 596,325 TEUs are stopped in the closed ports and become 
“frustrated cargo” while they wait for disposition instructions from the operator.  The 
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TEU  Port 
Handling 
Capacity    
(4-attacks)
Baltimore 120,678     27,371      93,307     11.72% 100.00%
Charleston 93,713       15,805      77,908     9.78% 100.00%
Houston 35,355       20,178      15,177     1.91% 100.00%
Jacksonville 53,300       7,369        45,931     5.77% 100.00%
Lazaro Cardenas, MX 14,000       301           13,699     1.72% 100.00%
Los Angeles/Long Beach 65,242       270,870    (205,628)  -25.82% 14.33%
New York/New Jersey 994            55,062      (54,068)    -6.79% 0.48%
Norfolk  54,902       54,217      685          0.09% 100.00%
Oakland 90,919       110,079    (19,160)    -2.41% 78.37%
Prince Rupert, BC 17,808       5,060        12,748     1.60% 100.00%
Savannah 102,770     3,215        99,555     12.50% 100.00%
Seattle/Tacoma -            160,314    (160,314)  -20.13% 0.00%
South Florida 95,470       14,316      81,154     10.19% 100.00%
Vancouver, BC 51,149       51,149      -           0.00% 100.00%  
Table 18.   Percent change in TEU port-handling capacity with a worst-case 4-node 
attack on ports and Transportation Analysis Zones vulnerable to attack.  For 
example, the port of LA-LB handles 270,870 TEUs in the baseline model.  
With LA-LB, NY-NJ, Oakland, and Seattle-Tacoma shutdown, the operator 
delays 65,242 TEUs, or 14.33% of its handling capacity, until LA-LB 
reopens.  This is a 205,628 TEU, or 25.82%, reduction in TEUs handled by 
LA-LB. 
The model gives us the five worst-case 1-node, 2-node, 3-node, 4-node, and 5-
node attack plans.  The model also gives the second through fifth best attacks but we are 
only considering worst-case scenarios as the suboptimal attacks would only benefit the 
operator for the reason that they are less costly (days).  Table 19 summarizes these attack 
























0 11,786,605    -                 11,786,605        14.82
1 LALBPort            13,524,784    -                 13,524,784        17.01
1 NewYorkNY           11,789,698    1,316,546       13,106,244        16.48
1 LosAngelesCA        11,794,728    855,946          12,650,674        15.91
1 SanJoseCA           12,016,602    256,676          12,273,278        15.43
1 ChicagoIL           11,786,605    519,596          12,306,201        15.47
2 LALBPort            SeaTacPort          15,174,532    -                 15,174,532        19.08
2 NewYorkNY           LALBPort            13,531,935    1,331,946       14,863,881        18.69
2 LALBPort            OaklandPort         14,722,125    -                 14,722,125        18.51
2 LosAngelesCA        LALBPort            13,532,416    881,146          14,413,562        18.12
2 LALBPort            VancouverBCPort     13,997,619    -                 13,997,619        17.6
3 LALBPort            OaklandPort         SeaTacPort          16,932,365    32,620            16,964,985        21.33
3 NewYorkNY           LALBPort            SeaTacPort          15,179,036    1,344,546       16,523,582        20.78
3 LALBPort            SeaTacPort          VancouverBCPort     15,774,368    167,832          15,942,200        20.05
3 LosAngelesCA        LALBPort            SeaTacPort          15,180,319    881,146          16,061,465        20.2
3 NewYorkNY           LALBPort            OaklandPort         14,731,328    1,152,746       15,884,074        19.97
4 LALBPort            NYNJPort            OaklandPort         SeaTacPort          14,896,246    3,699,654       18,595,900        23.38
4 LALBPort            OaklandPort         SeaTacPort          VancouverBCPort     17,327,161    520,562          17,847,723        22.44
4 NewYorkNY           LALBPort            OaklandPort         SeaTacPort          16,799,507    1,488,004       18,287,511        22.99
4 BaltimorePort       LALBPort            OaklandPort         SeaTacPort          16,384,289    979,300          17,363,589        21.83
4 BaltimorePort       LALBPort            NYNJPort            SeaTacPort          14,183,413    3,153,220       17,336,633        21.8
5 BaltimorePort       LALBPort            NYNJPort            OaklandPort         SeaTacPort 13,639,428    7,445,802       21,085,230        26.51
5 LALBPort            NYNJPort            OaklandPort         SeaTacPort          SouthFloridaPort 14,564,946    5,057,346       19,622,292        24.67
5 LALBPort            NYNJPort            OaklandPort         SavannahPort        SeaTacPort 14,075,332    6,611,234       20,686,566        26.01
5 JacksonvillePort    LALBPort            NYNJPort            OaklandPort         SeaTacPort 14,766,711    4,610,942       19,377,653        24.37
5 BaltimorePort       LALBPort            NYNJPort            SavannahPort        SeaTacPort 12,811,530    7,047,432       19,858,962        24.97  
Table 19.   Summary of total transportation costs by a given number of maximum 
attacks and the second through fifth best attack for each maximum number 
of attacks.  For example, the worst-case 5-node attack plan includes Ports of 
Baltimore, Los Angeles-Long Beach, New York-New Jersey, Oakland and 
Seattle-Tacoma.  The total transportation cost will be 21,085,230 
transportation days or 26.51 days/TEU.  The total cost is composed of a 
transit cost of 13,639,428 days and an additional 7,445,802 days in delay 
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Figure 14.   Additional transportation costs per worst-case attack. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
International containerized freight movement is a vital part of the supply chain for 
many companies, and a critical element of moving consumer goods to destinations within 
the U.S.  Containerized imports also present a clear security concern.  The potential for 
terrorists to ship dirty bombs, chemical or biological weapons, or even a nuclear weapon 
into the U.S. in a shipping container has been widely recognized and is a main concern of 
the Department of Homeland Security.   
The purpose of this thesis is to create a modeling tool for looking at container 
flows and the potential changes in those flows under a variety of conditions including 
port disruptions by extensive security-related delays, natural disasters, union work 
stoppages, and terrorist actions.  This effort has included a careful examination of 
available data on container movements, development of a network model to represent 
container movements both internationally and domestically and an estimation of those 
parameters that build a representative global transportation network.   
The model represents the major supply chain links serving manufacturers and 
consumers in the U.S., as well as export flow patterns for U.S. shippers serving 
worldwide markets.  The global network model represents flows of containerized freight 
between origins and destinations, where one or the other is outside the U.S.  An import 
container movement, for example, will follow a path through the network that involves a 
seaborne movement from a foreign origin port to a U.S. port of entry, a processing 
movement at the U.S. port, and then an overland movement by either truck or rail to its 
destination in the U.S.  A basic premise of the model is that path “choices” an operator 
makes in this network are based on total transportation costs (days) required to reach a 
destination.  Ports and access to destinations via truck and rail are subject to capacity 
limits.  Reduced capacity (or complete unavailability) of some facilities (ports, rail and 
highways connections) in such a model also result in adjustment of the flow patterns and 
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increase overall transportation costs.  The delays of flows and changes in costs inflicted 
by an attack are the prime drivers of economic impacts. 
We chose to use the Attacker-Defender model to operate our transportation 
network.  The Attacker-Defender model is a two-stage model that finds the best defense 
plan by finding the best attack.  The model allows the attacker to first attack the network, 
and then the defender alters flow on the network to optimize the flow of container TEUs 
on the attacked network.  Using this model the decision maker can defend the nodes that 
correspond to the worst-case attack. 
We have implemented the model, showed how to employ this model, and 
analyzed five situations that represent real-world TEU traffic flow disruptions.  We 
conclude that West Coast seaports are key components in the container transportation 
system.  The three West Coast ports modeled that represent five West Coast ports are in 
reality potential targets to a terrorist.  We determine the West Coast has sufficient 
infrastructure in place to accommodate increased security measures and reducing the the 
Port of Oakland’s port handling capacity by 30%.  Similarly, the East Coast has sufficient 
infrastructure to support the re-routed TEUs in case a hurricane shuts down the ports of 
Savannah, GA and Charleston for 14 days.  Conversely, there is insufficient West Coast 
infrastructure to accommodate an event, like a 7.8 magnitude earthquake, incapacitating 
the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach beyond a two-week period.  Such an event 
would render a strain not only on the West Coast ports but also on several East Coast 
ports that now have to handle the TEUs normally handled by the ports of Los Angeles 
and Long Beach, resulting with incremental transportation costs to ocean carriers of over 
1.7 million transportation days.  We find a labor union dispute the most significant threat 
to the vitality of the West Coast container transportation system.  We find a 14-day 
dispute increases the overall transportation cost by over 43% and fully occupies the the 
East Coast port’s TEU handling capacity with the exception of the ports of New York 
and New Jersey.  Lastly, we determine the five optimal attacks an intelligent terrorist 
might employ to maximize the cost on the U.S. economy.  Although we include three 
foreign ports in our model, all five plans include only domestic U.S. ports.  The five 
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optimal target ports for a terrorist are Los Angeles and Long Beach, Oakland, Seattle and 
Tacoma, Baltimore and New York and New Jersey. 
One limitation of our research is that we assume the operator can re-route TEUs 
individually (in a TEU flow model), even though in reality these are loaded on discrete 
ships, and the entire ship would have to be re-routed.  For the scenarios we examine, 
there are enough ships that we do not anticipate this restriction to introduce too much 
distortion.  The total number of TEUs handled in our model requires 160 Panamax class 
ships, each of which can hold 5,000 TEUs; according to Container Insight (2007), there 
are over 230 Panamax ships in service. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This representation of the internal United States container transportation system 
includes what we believe is a minimal level of realism for the function of this system—
demand for TEUs between foreign ports, domestic ports and TAZ pairs; as well as better 
detailed highway and rail capacities.  One way to do this is by incorporating more 
detailed or sophisticated representations with, for example, a higher fidelity rail network 
or more realistic highway-travel route patterns and congestion as influenced and directed 
by experts of intermodal planning and transportation systems. 
Additions to the model might also include the research and analysis of additional 
commodities to include strategic and domestic commodities and cargoes (e.g., bulk, 
break-bulk, and petroleum). 
In this model, we obtain optimal operator response plans.  To create effective 
contingency plans, however, the scope of the TSI impacts must be understood, and the 
wide range of stakeholders—shippers, international shipping lines, port authorities and 
terminal operators, rail carriers, trucking companies, etc.—must be engaged, so that the 
freight system responds to the disruption as a system, rather than as uncoordinated 
reactions from its various parts.  To accomplish this is a significant challenge. 
 60
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 61
APPENDIX A:  ESTIMATED ORIGIN DESTINATION TABLE FOR 
U.S. IMPORTS 
BostonMA 65 AtlantaGA 129 CincinnatiOH 96 KansasCityMO 45 FortWayneIN 753
NewYorkNY 218 JacksonvilleFL 47 DaytonOH 43 StLouisMO 69 IndianapolisIN 1790
PhiladelphiaPA 54 OrlandoFL 54 ToledoOH 44 NewOrleansLA 73 ChicagoIL 6849
BaltimoreMD 80 MiamiFL 92 DetroitMI 284 HoustonTX 144 MilwaukeeWI 1805
AtlantaGA 47 TampaFL 59 GrandRapidsMI 80 DallasTX 158 GreenBayWI 758
MiamiFL 36 BirminghamAL 52 FortWayneIN 59 DenverCO 82 DuluthMN 151
DetroitMI 41 NashvilleTN 41 IndianapolisIN 143 PhoenixAZ 65 MinneapolisMN 3311
ChicagoIL 73 MemphisTN 38 ChicagoIL 499 LasVegasNV 36 DesMoinesIA 1079
HoustonTX 45 LouisvilleKY 34 MilwaukeeWI 125 SeattleWA 62 KansasCityMO 1581
DallasTX 52 ClevelandOH 77 GreenBayWI 51 PortlandOR 44 StLouisMO 2097
SanJoseCA 58 ColumbusOH 41 MinneapolisMN 209 SanJoseCA 174 SpringfieldMO 403
CincinnatiOH 38 DesMoinesIA 71 SacramentoCA 34 LittleRockAR 606
LosAngelesCA 95 DetroitMI 129 KansasCityMO 110 LosAngelesCA 297 JacksonMS 507
BostonMA 69 GrandRapidsMI 36 StLouisMO 165 NewOrleansLA 1859
NewYorkNY 231 IndianapolisIN 59 LittleRockAR 51 SanDiegoCA 56 HoustonTX 4001
PhiladelphiaPA 58 ChicagoIL 214 JacksonMS 48 PortlandME 510 AustinTX 925
BaltimoreMD 88 MilwaukeeWI 54 NewOrleansLA 177 BostonMA 4636 DallasTX 4851
AtlantaGA 56 MinneapolisMN 91 HoustonTX 341 AlbanyNY 765 SanAntonioTX 1007
MiamiFL 38 KansasCityMO 44 AustinTX 76 SyracuseNY 672 CorpusChristiTX 444
DetroitMI 54 StLouisMO 65 DallasTX 375 RochesterNY 613 ElPasoTX 819
ChicagoIL 100 NewOrleansLA 56 SanAntonioTX 78 BuffaloNY 761 OklahomaCityOK 1081
MinneapolisMN 45 HoustonTX 113 CorpusChristiTX 36 NewYorkNY 15803 TulsaOK 941
HoustonTX 63 DallasTX 126 ElPasoTX 52 PittsburghPA 1449 WichitaKS 558
DallasTX 77 DenverCO 73 OklahomaCityOK 73 HarrisburgPA 804 OmahaNE 1109
DenverCO 49 PhoenixAZ 54 TulsaOK 71 PhiladelphiaPA 3927 SiouxFallsSD 411
PhoenixAZ 45 SeattleWA 54 WichitaKS 36 BaltimoreMD 5966 FargoND 449
SeattleWA 52 PortlandOR 37 OmahaNE 66 CharlestonWV 756 BillingsMT 541
PortlandOR 37 SanJoseCA 124 DenverCO 190 RichmondVA 728 DenverCO 3510
SanJoseCA 133 LosAngelesCA 205 AlbuquerqueNM 40 NorfolkVA 785 AlbuquerqueNM 698
SanDiegoCA 37 PhoenixAZ 144 GreenvilleNC 286 PhoenixAZ 2935
LosAngelesCA 205 LasVegasNV 67 WilmingtonNC 293 LasVegasNV 1787
SanDiegoCA 37 PortlandME 55 SaltLakeCityUT 63 RaleighNC 1095 SaltLakeCityUT 1595
BostonMA 62 BostonMA 495 BoiseCityID 47 GreensboroNC 686 BoiseCityID 1432
NewYorkNY 196 AlbanyNY 80 SeattleWA 122 CharlotteNC 1025 SeattleWA 4131
PhiladelphiaPA 45 SyracuseNY 66 PortlandOR 84 GreenvilleSC 802 PortlandOR 2832
BaltimoreMD 66 RochesterNY 59 SanJoseCA 320 ColumbiaSC 587 SanJoseCA 9141
AtlantaGA 34 BuffaloNY 70 SacramentoCA 63 CharlestonSC 250 ReddingCA 168
DetroitMI 34 NewYorkNY 1708 LosAngelesCA 548 AtlantaGA 3539 SacramentoCA 1793
ChicagoIL 56 PittsburghPA 136 SanDiegoCA 100 SavannahGA 264 FresnoCA 757
LosAngelesCA 55 HarrisburgPA 81 JacksonvilleFL 1260 LosAngelesCA 13243
BostonMA 58 PhiladelphiaPA 419 BostonMA 135 OrlandoFL 1474 SanDiegoCA 2408
BaltimoreMD 613 NewYorkNY 480 MiamiFL 2424 PortlandME 49
NewYorkNY 191 CharlestonWV 76 PittsburghPA 44 TampaFL 1657 BostonMA 456
PhiladelphiaPA 47 RichmondVA 78 PhiladelphiaPA 122 MobileAL 684 AlbanyNY 76
BaltimoreMD 70 NorfolkVA 88 BaltimoreMD 184 BirminghamAL 1517
AtlantaGA 38 RaleighNC 120 RaleighNC 38 ChattanoogaTN 298 SyracuseNY 66
DetroitMI 38 GreensboroNC 73 CharlotteNC 37 KnoxvilleTN 569 RochesterNY 60
ChicagoIL 66 CharlotteNC 110 AtlantaGA 136 NashvilleTN 1281 BuffaloNY 74
HoustonTX 38 GreenvilleSC 87 JacksonvilleFL 48 MemphisTN 1209 NewYorkNY 1554
ColumbiaSC 66 OrlandoFL 59 LouisvilleKY 1026 PittsburghPA 143
DallasTX 47 AtlantaGA 383 MiamiFL 98 LexingtonKY 562 HarrisburgPA 80
SeattleWA 34 JacksonvilleFL 153 TampaFL 69 ClevelandOH 2061 PhiladelphiaPA 386
SanJoseCA 78 OrlandoFL 172 BirminghamAL 59 ColumbusOH 1149 BaltimoreMD 587
LosAngelesCA 118 MiamiFL 297 NashvilleTN 45 CincinnatiOH 1105 CharlestonWV 74
BostonMA 231 TampaFL 191 MemphisTN 45 DaytonOH 507 RichmondVA 71
AlbanyNY 37 MobileAL 69 LouisvilleKY 34 LouisvilleKY 1026 NorfolkVA 77
NewYorkNY 752 BirminghamAL 162 ClevelandOH 62 LexingtonKY 562 RaleighNC 107
PittsburghPA 58 KnoxvilleTN 58 ColumbusOH 36 ClevelandOH 2061 GreensboroNC 67
HarrisburgPA 36 NashvilleTN 118 CincinnatiOH 36 ColumbusOH 1149 CharlotteNC 100
PhiladelphiaPA 177 MemphisTN 110 DetroitMI 106 CincinnatiOH 1105 GreenvilleSC 78
BaltimoreMD 256 LouisvilleKY 89 IndianapolisIN 58 DaytonOH 507 ColumbiaSC 58
NorfolkVA 34 LexingtonKY 51 ChicagoIL 203 ToledoOH 548 AtlantaGA 348
RaleighNC 47 ClevelandOH 177 MilwaukeeWI 51 DetroitMI 3634 JacksonvilleFL 124















GreensboroNC 67 PhiladelphiaPA 77 ChicagoIL 77 IndianapolisIN 62 JacksonMS 41
CharlotteNC 100 BaltimoreMD 111 NewOrleansLA 34 ChicagoIL 221 NewOrleansLA 150
GreenvilleSC 78 AtlantaGA 88 HoustonTX 59 MilwaukeeWI 56 HoustonTX 298
ColumbiaSC 58 JacksonvilleFL 40 DallasTX 60 MinneapolisMN 93 AustinTX 67
AtlantaGA 348 OrlandoFL 41 SanJoseCA 38 KansasCityMO 45 DallasTX 337
JacksonvilleFL 124 MiamiFL 73 LosAngelesCA 69 StLouisMO 66 SanAntonioTX 70
OrlandoFL 146 TampaFL 45 NewOrleansLA 58 ElPasoTX 48
MiamiFL 239 BirminghamAL 37 BostonMA 69 HoustonTX 115 OklahomaCityOK 70
TampaFL 163 DetroitMI 48 NewYorkNY 251 DallasTX 129 TulsaOK 70
MobileAL 67 ChicagoIL 88 PhiladelphiaPA 65 DenverCO 74 WichitaKS 37
BirminghamAL 150 MinneapolisMN 34 BaltimoreMD 98 PhoenixAZ 54 OmahaNE 74
KnoxvilleTN 56 NewOrleansLA 40 AtlantaGA 77 SeattleWA 55 DenverCO 195
NashvilleTN 126 HoustonTX 73 MiamiFL 55 PortlandOR 37 AlbuquerqueNM 38
MemphisTN 120 DallasTX 76 TampaFL 40 SanJoseCA 126 PhoenixAZ 142
LouisvilleKY 102 SanJoseCA 49 BirminghamAL 34 LosAngelesCA 207 LasVegasNV 73
LexingtonKY 55 LosAngelesCA 87 DetroitMI 55 SanDiegoCA 38 SaltLakeCityUT 69
ClevelandOH 203 ChicagoIL 109 BoiseCityID 54
ColumbusOH 113 BostonMA 126 MinneapolisMN 44 PortlandME 70 SeattleWA 146
CincinnatiOH 109 NewYorkNY 514 StLouisMO 38 BostonMA 618 PortlandOR 100
DaytonOH 49 PittsburghPA 40 NewOrleansLA 44 AlbanyNY 98 SanJoseCA 335
ToledoOH 54 PhiladelphiaPA 136 HoustonTX 84 SyracuseNY 81 SacramentoCA 66
DetroitMI 357 BaltimoreMD 194 DallasTX 89 RochesterNY 69 LosAngelesCA 548
GrandRapidsMI 103 RaleighNC 44 DenverCO 44 BuffaloNY 81 SanDiegoCA 100
FortWayneIN 74 CharlotteNC 44 SanJoseCA 89 NewYorkNY 1973
IndianapolisIN 176 GreenvilleSC 34 LosAngelesCA 154 PittsburghPA 150 BostonMA 107
ChicagoIL 673 AtlantaGA 168 HarrisburgPA 91 NewYorkNY 390
MilwaukeeWI 177 JacksonvilleFL 82 NewYorkNY 118 PhiladelphiaPA 460 PittsburghPA 36
GreenBayWI 74 OrlandoFL 84 BaltimoreMD 45 BaltimoreMD 666 PhiladelphiaPA 100
MinneapolisMN 326 MiamiFL 148 AtlantaGA 37 CharlestonWV 80 BaltimoreMD 151
DesMoinesIA 106 TampaFL 88 ChicagoIL 52 RichmondVA 81 AtlantaGA 121
KansasCityMO 155 BirminghamAL 69 HoustonTX 40 NorfolkVA 91 JacksonvilleFL 43
StLouisMO 206 NashvilleTN 41 DallasTX 43 RaleighNC 122 OrlandoFL 52
SpringfieldMO 40 MemphisTN 37 SanJoseCA 65 GreensboroNC 74 MiamiFL 85
LittleRockAR 59 ClevelandOH 48 LosAngelesCA 117 CharlotteNC 107 TampaFL 62
JacksonMS 49 DetroitMI 77 GreenvilleSC 81 BirminghamAL 54
NewOrleansLA 183 IndianapolisIN 43 BostonMA 38 ColumbiaSC 60 NashvilleTN 40
HoustonTX 393 ChicagoIL 142 NewYorkNY 122 AtlantaGA 339 MemphisTN 40
AustinTX 91 MilwaukeeWI 34 BaltimoreMD 43 JacksonvilleFL 122 ClevelandOH 51
DallasTX 477 MinneapolisMN 55 ChicagoIL 37 OrlandoFL 140 DetroitMI 87
SanAntonioTX 99 StLouisMO 49 LosAngelesCA 37 MiamiFL 239 IndianapolisIN 48
CorpusChristiTX 44 NewOrleansLA 70 TampaFL 157 ChicagoIL 169
ElPasoTX 81 HoustonTX 118 BostonMA 240 MobileAL 58 MilwaukeeWI 41
OklahomaCityOK 106 DallasTX 117 AlbanyNY 38 BirminghamAL 136 MinneapolisMN 69
TulsaOK 92 DenverCO 47 NewYorkNY 782 KnoxvilleTN 58 KansasCityMO 37
WichitaKS 55 PhoenixAZ 34 PittsburghPA 59 NashvilleTN 110 StLouisMO 59
OmahaNE 109 SanJoseCA 67 HarrisburgPA 36 MemphisTN 100 NewOrleansLA 67
SiouxFallsSD 40 LosAngelesCA 120 PhiladelphiaPA 184 LouisvilleKY 91 HoustonTX 131
FargoND 44 BaltimoreMD 264 LexingtonKY 51 DallasTX 139
BillingsMT 54 BostonMA 55 NorfolkVA 36 ClevelandOH 202 DenverCO 71
DenverCO 345 NewYorkNY 176 RaleighNC 48 ColumbusOH 110 PhoenixAZ 80
AlbuquerqueNM 69 PhiladelphiaPA 41 CharlotteNC 43 CincinnatiOH 102 LasVegasNV 45
PhoenixAZ 289 BaltimoreMD 59 AtlantaGA 133 DaytonOH 48 SaltLakeCityUT 36
LasVegasNV 176 ChicagoIL 51 JacksonvilleFL 48 ToledoOH 52 SeattleWA 70
SaltLakeCityUT 157 LosAngelesCA 49 OrlandoFL 55 DetroitMI 343 PortlandOR 51
BoiseCityID 142 MiamiFL 95 GrandRapidsMI 96 SanJoseCA 224
SeattleWA 407 BostonMA 76 TampaFL 60 FortWayneIN 69 SacramentoCA 44
PortlandOR 279 NewYorkNY 297 BirminghamAL 54 IndianapolisIN 158 LosAngelesCA 407
SanJoseCA 899 PhiladelphiaPA 77 NashvilleTN 43 ChicagoIL 572 SanDiegoCA 82
SacramentoCA 176 BaltimoreMD 109 MemphisTN 38 MilwaukeeWI 144
FresnoCA 74 AtlantaGA 78 LouisvilleKY 36 GreenBayWI 59 BostonMA 118
LosAngelesCA 1302 JacksonvilleFL 37 ClevelandOH 80 MinneapolisMN 240 NewYorkNY 431
SanDiegoCA 236 OrlandoFL 37 ColumbusOH 43 DesMoinesIA 82 PittsburghPA 40
MiamiFL 69 CincinnatiOH 40 KansasCityMO 117 PhiladelphiaPA 111
BostonMA 77 TampaFL 40 DetroitMI 133 StLouisMO 172 BaltimoreMD 166


















CharlotteNC 34 KnoxvilleTN 107 BaltimoreMD 365 RichmondVA 36 DallasTX 69
AtlantaGA 133 NashvilleTN 242 CharlestonWV 45 NorfolkVA 38 DenverCO 40
JacksonvilleFL 48 MemphisTN 228 RichmondVA 45 RaleighNC 55 SanJoseCA 73
OrlandoFL 58 LouisvilleKY 194 NorfolkVA 49 GreensboroNC 34 LosAngelesCA 120
MiamiFL 95 LexingtonKY 106 RaleighNC 69 CharlotteNC 52
TampaFL 69 ClevelandOH 389 GreensboroNC 43 GreenvilleSC 40 PortlandME 65
BirminghamAL 59 ColumbusOH 217 CharlotteNC 62 AtlantaGA 176 BostonMA 570
NashvilleTN 43 CincinnatiOH 209 GreenvilleSC 47 JacksonvilleFL 63 AlbanyNY 91
MemphisTN 44 DaytonOH 96 ColumbiaSC 36 OrlandoFL 74 SyracuseNY 76
ClevelandOH 56 ToledoOH 103 AtlantaGA 199 MiamiFL 122 RochesterNY 66
DetroitMI 95 DetroitMI 686 JacksonvilleFL 71 TampaFL 84 BuffaloNY 78
IndianapolisIN 54 GrandRapidsMI 198 OrlandoFL 84 BirminghamAL 76 NewYorkNY 1844
ChicagoIL 187 FortWayneIN 142 MiamiFL 143 NashvilleTN 62 PittsburghPA 146
MilwaukeeWI 45 IndianapolisIN 337 TampaFL 95 MemphisTN 60 HarrisburgPA 88
MinneapolisMN 76 ChicagoIL 1282 MobileAL 36 LouisvilleKY 49 PhiladelphiaPA 441
KansasCityMO 41 MilwaukeeWI 339 BirminghamAL 82 ClevelandOH 100 BaltimoreMD 643
StLouisMO 65 GreenBayWI 142 NashvilleTN 67 ColumbusOH 56 CharlestonWV 77
NewOrleansLA 76 MinneapolisMN 618 MemphisTN 63 CincinnatiOH 54 RichmondVA 80
HoustonTX 143 DesMoinesIA 202 LouisvilleKY 55 DetroitMI 176 NorfolkVA 88
DallasTX 153 KansasCityMO 297 ClevelandOH 117 GrandRapidsMI 51 RaleighNC 118
DenverCO 78 StLouisMO 394 ColumbusOH 63 FortWayneIN 37 GreensboroNC 73
PhoenixAZ 88 SpringfieldMO 76 CincinnatiOH 60 IndianapolisIN 87 CharlotteNC 106
LasVegasNV 49 LittleRockAR 114 DetroitMI 199 ChicagoIL 328 GreenvilleSC 80
SaltLakeCityUT 40 JacksonMS 96 GrandRapidsMI 56 MilwaukeeWI 87 ColumbiaSC 59
SeattleWA 77 NewOrleansLA 349 FortWayneIN 40 GreenBayWI 36 AtlantaGA 334
PortlandOR 56 HoustonTX 752 IndianapolisIN 93 MinneapolisMN 157 JacksonvilleFL 121
SanJoseCA 247 AustinTX 174 ChicagoIL 342 DesMoinesIA 51 OrlandoFL 142
SacramentoCA 48 DallasTX 910 MilwaukeeWI 88 KansasCityMO 76 MiamiFL 238
LosAngelesCA 448 SanAntonioTX 190 GreenBayWI 36 StLouisMO 102 TampaFL 157
SanDiegoCA 91 CorpusChristiTX 82 MinneapolisMN 148 NewOrleansLA 91 MobileAL 58
ElPasoTX 151 DesMoinesIA 51 HoustonTX 195 BirminghamAL 135
PortlandME 98 OklahomaCityOK 202 KansasCityMO 74 AustinTX 45 KnoxvilleTN 56
BostonMA 881 TulsaOK 177 StLouisMO 104 DallasTX 236 NashvilleTN 109
AlbanyNY 146 WichitaKS 104 NewOrleansLA 93 SanAntonioTX 49 MemphisTN 100
SyracuseNY 128 OmahaNE 207 HoustonTX 191 ElPasoTX 38 LouisvilleKY 89
RochesterNY 117 SiouxFallsSD 77 AustinTX 44 OklahomaCityOK 52 LexingtonKY 51
BuffaloNY 144 FargoND 84 DallasTX 221 TulsaOK 47 ClevelandOH 198
NewYorkNY 2995 BillingsMT 99 SanAntonioTX 47 OmahaNE 52 ColumbusOH 106
PittsburghPA 275 DenverCO 650 OklahomaCityOK 47 DenverCO 162 CincinnatiOH 99
HarrisburgPA 153 AlbuquerqueNM 129 TulsaOK 45 PhoenixAZ 137 DaytonOH 47
PhiladelphiaPA 743 PhoenixAZ 543 OmahaNE 48 LasVegasNV 81 ToledoOH 49
BaltimoreMD 1131 LasVegasNV 328 DenverCO 133 SaltLakeCityUT 71 DetroitMI 332
CharlestonWV 143 SaltLakeCityUT 293 PhoenixAZ 110 BoiseCityID 62 GrandRapidsMI 93
RichmondVA 137 BoiseCityID 260 LasVegasNV 66 SeattleWA 176 FortWayneIN 66
NorfolkVA 148 SeattleWA 745 SaltLakeCityUT 58 PortlandOR 122 IndianapolisIN 155
GreenvilleNC 54 PortlandOR 511 BoiseCityID 49 SanJoseCA 411 ChicagoIL 555
WilmingtonNC 55 SanJoseCA 1665 SeattleWA 142 SacramentoCA 81 MilwaukeeWI 142
RaleighNC 207 SacramentoCA 327 PortlandOR 98 FresnoCA 34 GreenBayWI 58
GreensboroNC 131 FresnoCA 139 SanJoseCA 327 LosAngelesCA 610 MinneapolisMN 238
CharlotteNC 194 LosAngelesCA 2430 SacramentoCA 65 SanDiegoCA 110 DesMoinesIA 80
GreenvilleSC 153 SanDiegoCA 441 LosAngelesCA 486 KansasCityMO 115
ColumbiaSC 111 SanDiegoCA 88 BostonMA 106 StLouisMO 169
CharlestonSC 47 PortlandME 34 NewYorkNY 348 LittleRockAR 47
AtlantaGA 666 BostonMA 308 BostonMA 232 PhiladelphiaPA 84 JacksonMS 41
SavannahGA 49 AlbanyNY 49 AlbanyNY 38 BaltimoreMD 124 NewOrleansLA 151
JacksonvilleFL 238 SyracuseNY 43 BuffaloNY 37 AtlantaGA 66 HoustonTX 302
OrlandoFL 278 RochesterNY 37 NewYorkNY 779 MiamiFL 47 AustinTX 69
MiamiFL 460 BuffaloNY 45 PittsburghPA 71 ClevelandOH 38 DallasTX 343
TampaFL 315 NewYorkNY 1010 HarrisburgPA 40 DetroitMI 65 SanAntonioTX 71
MobileAL 128 PittsburghPA 85 PhiladelphiaPA 192 ChicagoIL 110 ElPasoTX 49
BirminghamAL 286 HarrisburgPA 49 BaltimoreMD 294 MinneapolisMN 47 OklahomaCityOK 70













WichitaKS 37 StLouisMO 265 KansasCityMO 69 OklahomaCityOK 34 ChicagoIL 163
OmahaNE 74 SpringfieldMO 51 StLouisMO 92 OmahaNE 36 MilwaukeeWI 43
DenverCO 195 LittleRockAR 77 NewOrleansLA 81 DenverCO 93 MinneapolisMN 78
AlbuquerqueNM 40 JacksonMS 65 HoustonTX 174 PhoenixAZ 67 KansasCityMO 37
PhoenixAZ 146 NewOrleansLA 236 AustinTX 40 LasVegasNV 34 StLouisMO 51
LasVegasNV 74 HoustonTX 510 DallasTX 210 SeattleWA 69 NewOrleansLA 45
SaltLakeCityUT 70 AustinTX 118 SanAntonioTX 44 PortlandOR 48 HoustonTX 96
BoiseCityID 54 DallasTX 620 ElPasoTX 34 SanJoseCA 159 DallasTX 117
SeattleWA 148 SanAntonioTX 128 OklahomaCityOK 47 LosAngelesCA 260 DenverCO 82
PortlandOR 102 CorpusChristiTX 56 TulsaOK 41 SanDiegoCA 48 PhoenixAZ 70
SanJoseCA 342 ElPasoTX 106 OmahaNE 47 LasVegasNV 41
SacramentoCA 67 OklahomaCityOK 139 DenverCO 147 BostonMA 56 SaltLakeCityUT 37
LosAngelesCA 567 TulsaOK 120 PhoenixAZ 122 NewYorkNY 192 SeattleWA 93
SanDiegoCA 103 WichitaKS 71 LasVegasNV 73 PhiladelphiaPA 48 PortlandOR 65
OmahaNE 143 SaltLakeCityUT 65 BaltimoreMD 73 SanJoseCA 213
PortlandME 63 SiouxFallsSD 54 BoiseCityID 56 AtlantaGA 47 SacramentoCA 41
BostonMA 576 FargoND 59 SeattleWA 159 DetroitMI 44 LosAngelesCA 312
AlbanyNY 95 BillingsMT 73 PortlandOR 110 ChicagoIL 84 SanDiegoCA 56
SyracuseNY 84 DenverCO 459 SanJoseCA 365 MinneapolisMN 37
RochesterNY 77 AlbuquerqueNM 91 SacramentoCA 71 HoustonTX 54 BostonMA 47
BuffaloNY 96 PhoenixAZ 385 LosAngelesCA 541 DallasTX 65 NewYorkNY 150
NewYorkNY 1973 LasVegasNV 239 SanDiegoCA 98 DenverCO 41 PhiladelphiaPA 36
PittsburghPA 181 SaltLakeCityUT 213 PhoenixAZ 40 BaltimoreMD 51
HarrisburgPA 100 BoiseCityID 196 BostonMA 293 SeattleWA 44 ChicagoIL 44
PhiladelphiaPA 492 SeattleWA 573 AlbanyNY 47 SanJoseCA 114 LosAngelesCA 43
BaltimoreMD 745 PortlandOR 392 SyracuseNY 38 LosAngelesCA 179
CharlestonWV 95 SanJoseCA 1238 BuffaloNY 40 BostonMA 43
RichmondVA 91 SacramentoCA 243 NewYorkNY 945 BostonMA 98 NewYorkNY 140
NorfolkVA 98 FresnoCA 102 PittsburghPA 73 NewYorkNY 321 BaltimoreMD 47
GreenvilleNC 36 LosAngelesCA 1765 HarrisburgPA 44 PhiladelphiaPA 77 ChicagoIL 38
WilmingtonNC 36 SanDiegoCA 321 PhiladelphiaPA 225 BaltimoreMD 115 LosAngelesCA 36
RaleighNC 136 BaltimoreMD 324 AtlantaGA 63
GreensboroNC 85 BostonMA 229 CharlestonWV 38 MiamiFL 45 BostonMA 41
CharlotteNC 128 AlbanyNY 37 RichmondVA 40 ClevelandOH 37 NewYorkNY 133
GreenvilleSC 100 BuffaloNY 34 NorfolkVA 44 DetroitMI 63 BaltimoreMD 45
ColumbiaSC 73 NewYorkNY 753 RaleighNC 59 ChicagoIL 109 ChicagoIL 40
AtlantaGA 444 PittsburghPA 65 GreensboroNC 36 MinneapolisMN 47 LosAngelesCA 40
JacksonvilleFL 158 HarrisburgPA 37 CharlotteNC 52 HoustonTX 60
OrlandoFL 184 PhiladelphiaPA 183 GreenvilleSC 40 DallasTX 70 BostonMA 63
MiamiFL 301 BaltimoreMD 273 AtlantaGA 165 DenverCO 41 NewYorkNY 210
TampaFL 207 CharlestonWV 34 JacksonvilleFL 59 SeattleWA 37 PhiladelphiaPA 52
MobileAL 87 NorfolkVA 37 OrlandoFL 67 SanJoseCA 87 BaltimoreMD 80
BirminghamAL 191 RaleighNC 51 MiamiFL 115 LosAngelesCA 131 AtlantaGA 47
ChattanoogaTN 37 CharlotteNC 47 TampaFL 76 DetroitMI 48
KnoxvilleTN 71 GreenvilleSC 36 BirminghamAL 66 NewYorkNY 103 ChicagoIL 89
NashvilleTN 161 AtlantaGA 157 NashvilleTN 54 BaltimoreMD 40 MinneapolisMN 43
MemphisTN 153 JacksonvilleFL 56 MemphisTN 48 ChicagoIL 44 HoustonTX 52
LouisvilleKY 129 OrlandoFL 66 LouisvilleKY 44 DallasTX 36 DallasTX 63
LexingtonKY 70 MiamiFL 109 ClevelandOH 99 SanJoseCA 37 DenverCO 44
ClevelandOH 258 TampaFL 74 ColumbusOH 52 LosAngelesCA 63 PhoenixAZ 37
ColumbusOH 144 BirminghamAL 67 CincinnatiOH 49 SeattleWA 48
CincinnatiOH 139 NashvilleTN 56 DetroitMI 165 BostonMA 113 SanJoseCA 110
DaytonOH 63 MemphisTN 54 GrandRapidsMI 45 NewYorkNY 382 LosAngelesCA 163
ToledoOH 69 LouisvilleKY 45 IndianapolisIN 76 PittsburghPA 36
DetroitMI 458 ClevelandOH 92 ChicagoIL 272 PhiladelphiaPA 95 BostonMA 69
GrandRapidsMI 132 ColumbusOH 51 MilwaukeeWI 69 BaltimoreMD 144 NewYorkNY 228
FortWayneIN 95 CincinnatiOH 49 MinneapolisMN 115 AtlantaGA 87 PhiladelphiaPA 55
IndianapolisIN 225 DetroitMI 161 DesMoinesIA 38 OrlandoFL 36 BaltimoreMD 84
ChicagoIL 870 GrandRapidsMI 47 KansasCityMO 56 MiamiFL 59 AtlantaGA 48
MilwaukeeWI 229 IndianapolisIN 78 StLouisMO 82 TampaFL 40 MiamiFL 36
GreenBayWI 96 ChicagoIL 298 NewOrleansLA 73 BirminghamAL 37 DetroitMI 44
MinneapolisMN 426 MilwaukeeWI 78 HoustonTX 143 ClevelandOH 49 ChicagoIL 76
DesMoinesIA 137 MinneapolisMN 142 DallasTX 162 DetroitMI 88 HoustonTX 47




















SanJoseCA 58 BillingsMT 47 SanJoseCA 51 LasVegasNV 117 IndianapolisIN 66
LosAngelesCA 95 DenverCO 302 LosAngelesCA 82 SaltLakeCityUT 104 ChicagoIL 236
AlbuquerqueNM 60 BoiseCityID 91 MilwaukeeWI 60
PortlandME 43 PhoenixAZ 251 PortlandME 37 SeattleWA 257 MinneapolisMN 100
BostonMA 390 LasVegasNV 155 BostonMA 332 PortlandOR 177 DesMoinesIA 34
AlbanyNY 65 SaltLakeCityUT 137 AlbanyNY 55 SanJoseCA 587 KansasCityMO 48
SyracuseNY 56 BoiseCityID 125 SyracuseNY 48 SacramentoCA 115 StLouisMO 71
RochesterNY 52 SeattleWA 363 RochesterNY 44 FresnoCA 49 NewOrleansLA 63
BuffaloNY 65 PortlandOR 249 BuffaloNY 54 LosAngelesCA 871 HoustonTX 124
NewYorkNY 1334 SanJoseCA 801 NewYorkNY 1127 SanDiegoCA 157 DallasTX 139
PittsburghPA 122 SacramentoCA 157 PittsburghPA 103 DenverCO 80
HarrisburgPA 67 FresnoCA 66 HarrisburgPA 58 BostonMA 150 PhoenixAZ 58
PhiladelphiaPA 332 LosAngelesCA 1151 PhiladelphiaPA 279 NewYorkNY 488 SeattleWA 58
BaltimoreMD 504 SanDiegoCA 209 BaltimoreMD 425 PittsburghPA 40 PortlandOR 40
CharlestonWV 63 CharlestonWV 54 PhiladelphiaPA 117 SanJoseCA 133
RichmondVA 62 BostonMA 202 RichmondVA 52 BaltimoreMD 172 LosAngelesCA 220
NorfolkVA 66 NewYorkNY 655 NorfolkVA 56 AtlantaGA 91 SanDiegoCA 40
RaleighNC 92 PittsburghPA 49 RaleighNC 78 OrlandoFL 38
GreensboroNC 58 PhiladelphiaPA 154 GreensboroNC 49 MiamiFL 65 BostonMA 47
CharlotteNC 87 BaltimoreMD 220 CharlotteNC 73 TampaFL 43 NewYorkNY 173
GreenvilleSC 67 RaleighNC 40 GreenvilleSC 58 BirminghamAL 37 PhiladelphiaPA 44
ColumbiaSC 49 CharlotteNC 34 ColumbiaSC 43 ClevelandOH 54 BaltimoreMD 65
AtlantaGA 298 AtlantaGA 109 AtlantaGA 250 DetroitMI 91 AtlantaGA 48
JacksonvilleFL 106 JacksonvilleFL 40 JacksonvilleFL 89 IndianapolisIN 43 MiamiFL 41
OrlandoFL 124 OrlandoFL 45 OrlandoFL 104 ChicagoIL 153 ChicagoIL 51
MiamiFL 205 MiamiFL 78 MiamiFL 173 MilwaukeeWI 38 HoustonTX 38
TampaFL 139 TampaFL 51 TampaFL 118 MinneapolisMN 66 DallasTX 40
MobileAL 58 BirminghamAL 43 MobileAL 48 StLouisMO 47 LosAngelesCA 48
BirminghamAL 128 NashvilleTN 34 BirminghamAL 107 NewOrleansLA 41
KnoxvilleTN 48 ClevelandOH 66 KnoxvilleTN 41 HoustonTX 84 BostonMA 137
NashvilleTN 109 ColumbusOH 34 NashvilleTN 91 DallasTX 95 NewYorkNY 467
MemphisTN 103 DetroitMI 110 MemphisTN 85 DenverCO 55 PittsburghPA 43
LouisvilleKY 87 IndianapolisIN 51 LouisvilleKY 73 PhoenixAZ 41 PhiladelphiaPA 115
LexingtonKY 48 ChicagoIL 180 LexingtonKY 40 SeattleWA 43 BaltimoreMD 176
ClevelandOH 173 MilwaukeeWI 45 ClevelandOH 146 SanJoseCA 99 AtlantaGA 104
ColumbusOH 98 MinneapolisMN 76 ColumbusOH 81 LosAngelesCA 163 JacksonvilleFL 37
CincinnatiOH 93 KansasCityMO 36 CincinnatiOH 78 OrlandoFL 44
DaytonOH 43 StLouisMO 54 DaytonOH 36 BostonMA 264 MiamiFL 73
ToledoOH 47 NewOrleansLA 48 ToledoOH 38 AlbanyNY 41 TampaFL 49
DetroitMI 306 HoustonTX 95 DetroitMI 256 SyracuseNY 34 BirminghamAL 44
GrandRapidsMI 89 DallasTX 106 GrandRapidsMI 73 BuffaloNY 34 NashvilleTN 37
FortWayneIN 65 DenverCO 59 FortWayneIN 52 NewYorkNY 846 MemphisTN 36
IndianapolisIN 153 PhoenixAZ 44 IndianapolisIN 125 PittsburghPA 65 ClevelandOH 60
ChicagoIL 580 SeattleWA 44 ChicagoIL 475 HarrisburgPA 40 ColumbusOH 34
MilwaukeeWI 153 SanJoseCA 100 MilwaukeeWI 125 PhiladelphiaPA 201 DetroitMI 107
GreenBayWI 65 LosAngelesCA 166 GreenBayWI 52 BaltimoreMD 289 IndianapolisIN 52
MinneapolisMN 283 MinneapolisMN 227 CharlestonWV 34 ChicagoIL 198
DesMoinesIA 92 BostonMA 43 DesMoinesIA 74 RichmondVA 36 MilwaukeeWI 52
KansasCityMO 135 NewYorkNY 140 KansasCityMO 109 NorfolkVA 40 MinneapolisMN 95
StLouisMO 179 PhiladelphiaPA 34 StLouisMO 147 RaleighNC 52 KansasCityMO 45
SpringfieldMO 34 BaltimoreMD 51 LittleRockAR 43 CharlotteNC 47 StLouisMO 60
LittleRockAR 51 ChicagoIL 48 JacksonMS 36 GreenvilleSC 34 NewOrleansLA 54
JacksonMS 43 SanJoseCA 48 NewOrleansLA 129 AtlantaGA 144 HoustonTX 117
NewOrleansLA 157 LosAngelesCA 73 HoustonTX 278 JacksonvilleFL 52 DallasTX 140
HoustonTX 339 AustinTX 65 OrlandoFL 59 DenverCO 99
AustinTX 78 BostonMA 92 DallasTX 335 MiamiFL 102 PhoenixAZ 82
DallasTX 414 NewYorkNY 294 SanAntonioTX 70 TampaFL 66 LasVegasNV 49
SanAntonioTX 85 PhiladelphiaPA 69 ElPasoTX 55 BirminghamAL 58 SaltLakeCityUT 44
CorpusChristiTX 37 BaltimoreMD 99 OklahomaCityOK 74 NashvilleTN 45 BoiseCityID 38
ElPasoTX 70 AtlantaGA 51 TulsaOK 66 MemphisTN 41 SeattleWA 110
OklahomaCityOK 92 MiamiFL 36 WichitaKS 38 LouisvilleKY 38 PortlandOR 76
TulsaOK 80 DetroitMI 52 OmahaNE 76 ClevelandOH 87 SanJoseCA 249
WichitaKS 48 ChicagoIL 85 BillingsMT 36 ColumbusOH 47 SacramentoCA 49
OmahaNE 95 MinneapolisMN 36 DenverCO 235 CincinnatiOH 43 LosAngelesCA 368
SiouxFallsSD 36 HoustonTX 45 AlbuquerqueNM 48 DetroitMI 144 SanDiegoCA 67
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APPENDIX B:  ESTIMATED ORIGIN DESTINATION TABLE FOR 
U.S. EXPORTS 
BELGIUM 54 RUSSIA 44 PHILIPPINES 158 INDIA 58 CHINAMNLND 971
BRAZIL 85 SINGAPORE 66 POLAND 60 INDONESIA 70 CHINATAIWAN 77
CHINAMNLND 977 SOUTHAFRICA 48 PORTUGAL 45 ITALY 55 GERMANY 89
CHINATAIWAN 77 SOUTHKOREA 323 RUSSIA 87 JAPAN 214 HONGKONG 110
FRANCE 37 SPAIN 125 SINGAPORE 113 MALAYSIA 66 INDIA 52
GERMANY 107 SWEDEN 52 SOUTHAFRICA 82 PHILIPPINES 36 INDONESIA 43
HONGKONG 110 THAILAND 271 SOUTHKOREA 545 SOUTHKOREA 136 ITALY 80
INDIA 58 TURKEY 92 SPAIN 250 THAILAND 98 JAPAN 104
INDONESIA 43 UNITEDKINGDOM 173 SRILANKA 55 VIETNAM 55 MALAYSIA 40
ITALY 92 VENEZUELA 118 SWEDEN 103 NETHERLANDS 44
JAPAN 104 VIETNAM 150 THAILAND 459 ARGENTINA 70 SOUTHKOREA 70
MALAYSIA 44 TURKEY 174 AUSTRALIA 128 THAILAND 59
NETHERLANDS 51 BELGIUM 37 UNITEDKINGDOM 346 AUSTRIA 52 UNITEDKINGDOM 41
SOUTHKOREA 70 BRAZIL 80 VENEZUELA 157 BANGLADESH 77
SPAIN 36 CHINAMNLND 1182 VIETNAM 253 BELGIUM 337 CHINAMNLND 319
THAILAND 59 CHINATAIWAN 92 BRAZIL 529 HONGKONG 36
UNITEDKINGDOM 49 GERMANY 73 CHINAMNLND 691 CHILE 135 JAPAN 34
HONGKONG 132 CHINATAIWAN 55 CHINAMNLND 5918
BRAZIL 43 INDIA 51 HONGKONG 76 CHINATAIWAN 464 BELGIUM 44
CHINAMNLND 890 INDONESIA 51 JAPAN 80 COLOMBIA 95 BRAZIL 81
CHINATAIWAN 70 ITALY 70 SOUTHKOREA 51 COSTARICA 143 CHINAMNLND 964
GERMANY 41 JAPAN 128 THAILAND 38 DENMARK 55 CHINATAIWAN 76
HONGKONG 99 MALAYSIA 48 DOMINICANREP 133 GERMANY 88
INDONESIA 37 NETHERLANDS 36 AUSTRALIA 45 ECUADOR 78 HONGKONG 109
ITALY 40 SOUTHKOREA 85 BELGIUM 76 ELSALVADOR 40 INDIA 52
JAPAN 99 THAILAND 70 BRAZIL 173 FINLAND 43 INDONESIA 41
MALAYSIA 34 VIETNAM 38 CHILE 59 FRANCE 234 ITALY 80
SOUTHKOREA 65 CHINAMNLND 1934 GERMANY 675 JAPAN 103
THAILAND 51 ARGENTINA 87 CHINATAIWAN 153 GUATEMALA 109 MALAYSIA 40
AUSTRALIA 165 COLOMBIA 45 HONDURAS 118 NETHERLANDS 43
ARGENTINA 51 AUSTRIA 56 COSTARICA 77 HONGKONG 669 SOUTHKOREA 69
AUSTRALIA 106 BANGLADESH 92 DOMINICANREP 58 INDIA 356 THAILAND 58
BANGLADESH 51 BELGIUM 372 ECUADOR 40 INDONESIA 260 UNITEDKINGDOM 41
BELGIUM 188 BRAZIL 655 FRANCE 52 ISRAEL 104
BRAZIL 409 CHILE 185 GERMANY 148 ITALY 580 BELGIUM 60
CHILE 136 CHINAMNLND 7614 GUATEMALA 54 JAPAN 629 BRAZIL 118
CHINAMNLND 4517 CHINATAIWAN 598 HONDURAS 59 MALAYSIA 271 CHILE 37
CHINATAIWAN 354 COLOMBIA 137 HONGKONG 217 NETHERLANDS 324 CHINAMNLND 1308
COLOMBIA 107 COSTARICA 217 INDIA 95 NEWZEALAND 55 CHINATAIWAN 103
COSTARICA 190 DENMARK 59 INDONESIA 84 PAKISTAN 125 COSTARICA 49
DOMINICANREP 137 DOMINICANREP 191 ITALY 137 PERU 34 DOMINICANREP 38
ECUADOR 88 ECUADOR 111 JAPAN 209 PHILIPPINES 124 FRANCE 41
ELSALVADOR 45 ELSALVADOR 58 MALAYSIA 80 POLAND 55 GERMANY 117
FRANCE 129 FINLAND 47 NETHERLANDS 73 PORTUGAL 41 HONDURAS 34
GERMANY 371 FRANCE 257 PHILIPPINES 41 RUSSIA 80 HONGKONG 147
GUATEMALA 122 GERMANY 728 SOUTHKOREA 139 SINGAPORE 89 INDIA 71
HONDURAS 133 GUATEMALA 154 SPAIN 49 SOUTHAFRICA 69 INDONESIA 58
HONGKONG 507 HONDURAS 168 THAILAND 115 SOUTHKOREA 423 ITALY 107
INDIA 229 HONGKONG 859 TURKEY 37 SPAIN 229 JAPAN 139
INDONESIA 196 INDIA 422 UNITEDKINGDOM 69 SRILANKA 45 MALAYSIA 55
ISRAEL 65 INDONESIA 330 VENEZUELA 49 SWEDEN 96 NETHERLANDS 58
ITALY 341 ISRAEL 122 VIETNAM 63 THAILAND 360 SOUTHKOREA 93
JAPAN 485 ITALY 654 TURKEY 153 SPAIN 40
MALAYSIA 185 JAPAN 813 AUSTRALIA 34 UNITEDKINGDOM 316 THAILAND 80
NETHERLANDS 181 MALAYSIA 321 BRAZIL 51 VENEZUELA 113 UNITEDKINGDOM 55
NEWZEALAND 45 NETHERLANDS 360 CHINAMNLND 1827 VIETNAM 198 VIETNAM 44
PAKISTAN 80 NEWZEALAND 71 CHINATAIWAN 143
PERU 36 PAKISTAN 147 GERMANY 58 BELGIUM 45 CHINAMNLND 381
























JAPAN 41 SOUTHKOREA 102 NETHERLANDS 58 THAILAND 38 DOMINICANREP 73
SPAIN 37 SOUTHKOREA 106 ECUADOR 63
ARGENTINA 77 THAILAND 84 SPAIN 40 AUSTRALIA 92 FRANCE 131
AUSTRALIA 188 UNITEDKINGDOM 51 THAILAND 88 BANGLADESH 43 GERMANY 375
AUSTRIA 48 VIETNAM 47 UNITEDKINGDOM 55 BELGIUM 106 GUATEMALA 88
BANGLADESH 88 VIETNAM 48 BRAZIL 203 HONDURAS 96
BELGIUM 312 AUSTRALIA 56 CHILE 82 HONGKONG 521
BRAZIL 533 BELGIUM 113 BRAZIL 38 CHINAMNLND 4480 INDIA 229
CHILE 203 BRAZIL 190 CHINAMNLND 566 CHINATAIWAN 352 INDONESIA 198
CHINAMNLND 8742 CHILE 63 CHINATAIWAN 44 COLOMBIA 40 ISRAEL 65
CHINATAIWAN 687 CHINAMNLND 2630 GERMANY 36 COSTARICA 52 ITALY 339
COLOMBIA 109 CHINATAIWAN 206 HONGKONG 63 DOMINICANREP 47 JAPAN 500
COSTARICA 159 COLOMBIA 37 JAPAN 62 ECUADOR 49 MALAYSIA 190
DENMARK 51 COSTARICA 55 SOUTHKOREA 41 FRANCE 73 NETHERLANDS 183
DOMINICANREP 135 DOMINICANREP 49 GERMANY 213 NEWZEALAND 43
ECUADOR 124 ECUADOR 37 ARGENTINA 55 GUATEMALA 73 PAKISTAN 80
ELSALVADOR 65 FRANCE 78 AUSTRALIA 144 HONDURAS 80 PHILIPPINES 96
FINLAND 41 GERMANY 220 BANGLADESH 62 HONGKONG 495 RUSSIA 45
FRANCE 214 GUATEMALA 52 BELGIUM 184 INDIA 154 SINGAPORE 67
GERMANY 624 HONDURAS 56 BRAZIL 401 INDONESIA 183 SOUTHAFRICA 43
GUATEMALA 172 HONGKONG 295 CHILE 159 ISRAEL 40 SOUTHKOREA 332
HONDURAS 188 INDIA 135 CHINAMNLND 6192 ITALY 199 SPAIN 125
HONGKONG 974 INDONESIA 113 CHINATAIWAN 486 JAPAN 501 SWEDEN 54
INDIA 396 ISRAEL 38 COLOMBIA 92 MALAYSIA 173 THAILAND 276
INDONESIA 368 ITALY 202 COSTARICA 131 NETHERLANDS 103 TURKEY 92
ISRAEL 109 JAPAN 283 DOMINICANREP 107 NEWZEALAND 40 UNITEDKINGDOM 173
ITALY 565 MALAYSIA 107 ECUADOR 102 PAKISTAN 54 VENEZUELA 67
JAPAN 949 NETHERLANDS 110 ELSALVADOR 52 PHILIPPINES 91 VIETNAM 153
MALAYSIA 352 PAKISTAN 47 FRANCE 126 SINGAPORE 62
NETHERLANDS 301 PHILIPPINES 55 GERMANY 367 SOUTHKOREA 328 CHINAMNLND 194
NEWZEALAND 82 SINGAPORE 38 GUATEMALA 140 SPAIN 67
PAKISTAN 139 SOUTHKOREA 188 HONDURAS 153 THAILAND 254 BRAZIL 56
PERU 52 SPAIN 76 HONGKONG 691 TURKEY 56 CHINAMNLND 1046
PHILIPPINES 180 THAILAND 157 INDIA 256 UNITEDKINGDOM 95 CHINATAIWAN 82
POLAND 52 TURKEY 55 INDONESIA 265 VENEZUELA 44 GERMANY 52
PORTUGAL 37 UNITEDKINGDOM 103 ISRAEL 69 VIETNAM 142 HONGKONG 115
RUSSIA 76 VENEZUELA 41 ITALY 349 INDIA 38
SINGAPORE 126 VIETNAM 87 JAPAN 676 BELGIUM 45 INDONESIA 44
SOUTHAFRICA 74 MALAYSIA 249 BRAZIL 76 ITALY 51
SOUTHKOREA 628 BELGIUM 34 NETHERLANDS 179 CHINAMNLND 1377 JAPAN 117
SPAIN 206 BRAZIL 71 NEWZEALAND 63 CHINATAIWAN 109 MALAYSIA 41
SRILANKA 51 CHINAMNLND 749 PAKISTAN 89 GERMANY 89 SOUTHKOREA 76
SWEDEN 89 CHINATAIWAN 59 PERU 43 HONGKONG 154 THAILAND 60
THAILAND 514 GERMANY 66 PHILIPPINES 129 INDIA 58
TURKEY 155 HONGKONG 84 RUSSIA 45 INDONESIA 58 CHINAMNLND 573
UNITEDKINGDOM 283 INDIA 40 SINGAPORE 89 ITALY 81 CHINATAIWAN 45
VENEZUELA 124 ITALY 60 SOUTHAFRICA 54 JAPAN 151 HONGKONG 63
VIETNAM 284 JAPAN 80 SOUTHKOREA 448 MALAYSIA 55 JAPAN 65
SOUTHKOREA 54 SPAIN 121 NETHERLANDS 43 SOUTHKOREA 43
BELGIUM 56 THAILAND 45 SWEDEN 52 SOUTHKOREA 99
BRAZIL 103 THAILAND 363 THAILAND 80 BELGIUM 37
CHILE 36 BELGIUM 60 TURKEY 98 UNITEDKINGDOM 40 BRAZIL 63
CHINAMNLND 1410 BRAZIL 102 UNITEDKINGDOM 168 VIETNAM 44 CHINAMNLND 962
CHINATAIWAN 111 CHILE 36 VENEZUELA 98 CHINATAIWAN 76
COSTARICA 34 CHINAMNLND 1465 VIETNAM 201 ARGENTINA 44 GERMANY 74
FRANCE 38 CHINATAIWAN 115 AUSTRALIA 99 HONGKONG 109
GERMANY 111 FRANCE 41 BRAZIL 45 BANGLADESH 51 INDIA 45
HONGKONG 158 GERMANY 120 CHINAMNLND 646 BELGIUM 188 INDONESIA 41
INDIA 70 HONGKONG 165 CHINATAIWAN 51 BRAZIL 304 ITALY 67
INDONESIA 60 INDIA 73 GERMANY 52 CHILE 106 JAPAN 104
ITALY 102 INDONESIA 63 HONGKONG 73 CHINAMNLND 4638 MALAYSIA 38
JAPAN 151 ITALY 109 ITALY 47 CHINATAIWAN 364 NETHERLANDS 36
MALAYSIA 58 JAPAN 158 JAPAN 70 COLOMBIA 59 SOUTHKOREA 69


























UNITEDKINGDOM 34 CHINAMNLND 1024 SINGAPORE 74 INDIA 82 NETHERLANDS 38
CHINATAIWAN 80 SOUTHAFRICA 47 INDONESIA 70 PHILIPPINES 47
CHINAMNLND 967 COSTARICA 38 SOUTHKOREA 367 ITALY 122 SOUTHKOREA 168
CHINATAIWAN 76 GERMANY 88 SPAIN 107 JAPAN 173 THAILAND 126
HONGKONG 106 HONGKONG 115 SWEDEN 47 MALAYSIA 66 UNITEDKINGDOM 36
INDONESIA 38 INDIA 55 THAILAND 301 NETHERLANDS 66 VIETNAM 70
JAPAN 111 INDONESIA 45 TURKEY 85 PHILIPPINES 34
MALAYSIA 36 ITALY 81 UNITEDKINGDOM 148 SOUTHKOREA 115 BRAZIL 54
SOUTHKOREA 71 JAPAN 109 VENEZUELA 95 SPAIN 45 CHINAMNLND 719
THAILAND 54 MALAYSIA 43 VIETNAM 166 THAILAND 96 CHINATAIWAN 56
NETHERLANDS 44 UNITEDKINGDOM 62 GERMANY 55
BELGIUM 54 SOUTHKOREA 73 AUSTRALIA 51 VENEZUELA 54 HONGKONG 81
BRAZIL 85 THAILAND 62 BELGIUM 87 VIETNAM 54 INDIA 36
CHINAMNLND 1338 UNITEDKINGDOM 41 BRAZIL 154 ITALY 51
CHINATAIWAN 104 VIETNAM 34 CHILE 58 AUSTRALIA 45 JAPAN 77
FRANCE 37 CHINAMNLND 2285 BELGIUM 63 SOUTHKOREA 52
GERMANY 104 BELGIUM 51 CHINATAIWAN 180 BRAZIL 117 THAILAND 43
HONGKONG 150 BRAZIL 87 COSTARICA 48 CHILE 45
INDIA 65 CHINAMNLND 1025 DOMINICANREP 40 CHINAMNLND 2018 BRAZIL 54
INDONESIA 58 CHINATAIWAN 81 ECUADOR 36 CHINATAIWAN 158 CHINAMNLND 774
ITALY 95 FRANCE 36 FRANCE 60 COSTARICA 34 CHINATAIWAN 60
JAPAN 144 GERMANY 99 GERMANY 173 FRANCE 44 GERMANY 51
MALAYSIA 55 HONGKONG 115 GUATEMALA 49 GERMANY 128 HONGKONG 87
NETHERLANDS 51 INDIA 58 HONDURAS 54 GUATEMALA 38 INDIA 34
SOUTHKOREA 96 INDONESIA 44 HONGKONG 257 HONDURAS 41 ITALY 48
SPAIN 34 ITALY 89 INDIA 109 HONGKONG 225 JAPAN 84
THAILAND 80 JAPAN 110 INDONESIA 98 INDIA 85 SOUTHKOREA 55
UNITEDKINGDOM 48 MALAYSIA 44 ITALY 158 INDONESIA 85 THAILAND 47
VIETNAM 44 NETHERLANDS 49 JAPAN 247 ITALY 117
SOUTHKOREA 73 MALAYSIA 93 JAPAN 220 ARGENTINA 103
BRAZIL 55 SPAIN 34 NETHERLANDS 84 MALAYSIA 81 AUSTRALIA 383
CHINAMNLND 969 THAILAND 62 PAKISTAN 38 NETHERLANDS 62 AUSTRIA 47
CHINATAIWAN 76 UNITEDKINGDOM 47 PHILIPPINES 47 PHILIPPINES 41 BANGLADESH 155
GERMANY 65 VIETNAM 34 SOUTHKOREA 165 SOUTHKOREA 146 BELGIUM 297
HONGKONG 109 SPAIN 58 SPAIN 41 BRAZIL 585
INDIA 41 ARGENTINA 48 THAILAND 136 THAILAND 118 CHILE 298
INDONESIA 41 AUSTRALIA 120 TURKEY 43 UNITEDKINGDOM 58 CHINAMNLND 16903
ITALY 59 BANGLADESH 51 UNITEDKINGDOM 80 VIETNAM 66 CHINATAIWAN 1327
JAPAN 106 BELGIUM 163 VENEZUELA 37 COLOMBIA 107
MALAYSIA 38 BRAZIL 364 VIETNAM 76 BRAZIL 62 COSTARICA 135
SOUTHKOREA 70 CHILE 144 CHINAMNLND 725 DENMARK 49
THAILAND 56 CHINAMNLND 5107 BRAZIL 51 CHINATAIWAN 56 DOMINICANREP 121
CHINATAIWAN 401 CHINAMNLND 647 GERMANY 63 ECUADOR 176
BELGIUM 41 COLOMBIA 91 CHINATAIWAN 51 HONGKONG 82 ELSALVADOR 146
BRAZIL 77 COSTARICA 132 GERMANY 45 INDIA 38 FINLAND 41
CHINAMNLND 875 DOMINICANREP 104 HONGKONG 73 ITALY 58 FRANCE 202
CHINATAIWAN 69 ECUADOR 95 ITALY 43 JAPAN 77 GERMANY 599
GERMANY 80 ELSALVADOR 49 JAPAN 70 SOUTHKOREA 52 GUATEMALA 412
HONGKONG 99 FRANCE 113 SOUTHKOREA 47 THAILAND 44 HONDURAS 449
INDIA 49 GERMANY 326 THAILAND 38 HONGKONG 1848
INDONESIA 38 GUATEMALA 132 AUSTRALIA 49 INDIA 562
ITALY 73 HONDURAS 144 AUSTRALIA 37 BELGIUM 40 INDONESIA 684
JAPAN 93 HONGKONG 570 BELGIUM 67 BRAZIL 71 ISRAEL 118
MALAYSIA 37 INDIA 221 BRAZIL 163 CHILE 36 ITALY 578
NETHERLANDS 40 INDONESIA 220 CHILE 48 CHINAMNLND 2282 JAPAN 1929
SOUTHKOREA 63 ISRAEL 60 CHINAMNLND 1607 CHINATAIWAN 179 MALAYSIA 639
THAILAND 54 ITALY 308 CHINATAIWAN 126 GERMANY 80 NETHERLANDS 289
UNITEDKINGDOM 37 JAPAN 556 COLOMBIA 49 GUATEMALA 47 NEWZEALAND 173
MALAYSIA 205 COSTARICA 93 HONDURAS 51 PAKISTAN 166
CHINAMNLND 364 NETHERLANDS 159 DOMINICANREP 65 HONGKONG 249 PERU 77
GERMANY 34 NEWZEALAND 52 FRANCE 47 INDIA 76 PHILIPPINES 343
HONGKONG 41 PAKISTAN 77 GERMANY 133 INDONESIA 92 POLAND 51
JAPAN 38 PERU 38 GUATEMALA 44 ITALY 76 PORTUGAL 34
BELGIUM 45 PHILIPPINES 106 HONDURAS 48 JAPAN 261 RUSSIA 76



























SOUTHAFRICA 95 COSTARICA 166 DOMINICANREP 52 VIETNAM 54 PERU 124
SOUTHKOREA 1248 DOMINICANREP 120 ECUADOR 49 PHILIPPINES 420
SPAIN 190 ECUADOR 63 FRANCE 91 AUSTRALIA 55 POLAND 176
SRILANKA 78 FRANCE 92 GERMANY 262 BELGIUM 82 PORTUGAL 135
SWEDEN 85 GERMANY 261 GUATEMALA 69 BRAZIL 188 RUSSIA 253
THAILAND 941 GUATEMALA 87 HONDURAS 76 CHILE 74 SINGAPORE 298
TURKEY 166 HONDURAS 95 HONGKONG 470 CHINAMNLND 2371 SOUTHAFRICA 225
UNITEDKINGDOM 264 HONGKONG 350 INDIA 172 CHINATAIWAN 187 SOUTHKOREA 1447
VENEZUELA 117 INDIA 165 INDONESIA 176 COLOMBIA 49 SPAIN 749
VIETNAM 528 INDONESIA 137 ISRAEL 47 COSTARICA 78 SRILANKA 150
ISRAEL 47 ITALY 242 DOMINICANREP 59 SWEDEN 306
BELGIUM 49 ITALY 242 JAPAN 464 ECUADOR 51 THAILAND 1217
BRAZIL 96 JAPAN 330 MALAYSIA 168 FRANCE 56 TURKEY 496
CHILE 34 MALAYSIA 129 NETHERLANDS 128 GERMANY 163 UNITEDKINGDOM 1017
CHINAMNLND 1311 NETHERLANDS 128 NEWZEALAND 36 GUATEMALA 69 VENEZUELA 423
CHINATAIWAN 103 PAKISTAN 58 PAKISTAN 60 HONDURAS 76 VIETNAM 669
FRANCE 34 PHILIPPINES 66 PHILIPPINES 87 HONGKONG 265
GERMANY 99 SINGAPORE 45 SINGAPORE 60 INDIA 107 BELGIUM 51
HONGKONG 147 SOUTHAFRICA 36 SOUTHKOREA 306 INDONESIA 102 BRAZIL 93
INDIA 63 SOUTHKOREA 221 SPAIN 87 ITALY 154 CHINAMNLND 1002
INDONESIA 56 SPAIN 89 SWEDEN 37 JAPAN 257 CHINATAIWAN 78
ITALY 91 SWEDEN 37 THAILAND 245 MALAYSIA 96 FRANCE 36
JAPAN 142 THAILAND 188 TURKEY 67 NETHERLANDS 80 GERMANY 99
MALAYSIA 54 TURKEY 66 UNITEDKINGDOM 120 PAKISTAN 37 HONGKONG 113
NETHERLANDS 48 UNITEDKINGDOM 121 VENEZUELA 49 PHILIPPINES 49 INDIA 58
SOUTHKOREA 95 VENEZUELA 100 VIETNAM 136 SINGAPORE 34 INDONESIA 44
THAILAND 78 VIETNAM 103 SOUTHKOREA 170 ITALY 89
UNITEDKINGDOM 45 BRAZIL 73 SPAIN 55 JAPAN 107
VIETNAM 43 AUSTRALIA 47 CHINAMNLND 872 THAILAND 140 MALAYSIA 44
BELGIUM 78 CHINATAIWAN 69 TURKEY 43 NETHERLANDS 49
AUSTRALIA 36 BRAZIL 135 GERMANY 62 UNITEDKINGDOM 76 SOUTHKOREA 71
BELGIUM 55 CHILE 51 HONGKONG 98 VENEZUELA 52 SPAIN 34
BRAZIL 118 CHINAMNLND 2305 INDIA 41 VIETNAM 77 THAILAND 60
CHILE 45 CHINATAIWAN 181 INDONESIA 37 UNITEDKINGDOM 47
CHINAMNLND 1544 COSTARICA 38 ITALY 59 ARGENTINA 235
CHINATAIWAN 121 FRANCE 54 JAPAN 95 AUSTRALIA 434 BELGIUM 38
COSTARICA 43 GERMANY 158 MALAYSIA 36 AUSTRIA 168 BRAZIL 78
DOMINICANREP 34 GUATEMALA 43 SOUTHKOREA 63 BANGLADESH 251 CHINAMNLND 1381
FRANCE 38 HONDURAS 47 THAILAND 52 BELGIUM 1095 CHINATAIWAN 109
GERMANY 109 HONGKONG 257 BRAZIL 1826 GERMANY 77
GUATEMALA 41 INDIA 102 AUSTRALIA 37 CHILE 481 HONGKONG 154
HONDURAS 44 INDONESIA 96 BELGIUM 60 CHINAMNLND 20171 INDIA 54
HONGKONG 173 ITALY 144 BRAZIL 126 CHINATAIWAN 1584 INDONESIA 59
INDIA 73 JAPAN 251 CHILE 45 COLOMBIA 367 ITALY 71
INDONESIA 67 MALAYSIA 92 CHINAMNLND 1634 COSTARICA 578 JAPAN 151
ITALY 102 NETHERLANDS 77 CHINATAIWAN 128 DENMARK 174 MALAYSIA 55
JAPAN 166 PAKISTAN 36 COSTARICA 45 DOMINICANREP 521 NETHERLANDS 37
MALAYSIA 63 PHILIPPINES 47 DOMINICANREP 36 ECUADOR 286 SOUTHKOREA 99
NETHERLANDS 54 SOUTHKOREA 166 FRANCE 41 ELSALVADOR 147 THAILAND 81
SOUTHKOREA 111 SPAIN 52 GERMANY 120 FINLAND 137 UNITEDKINGDOM 34
SPAIN 36 THAILAND 135 GUATEMALA 40 FRANCE 760 VIETNAM 44
THAILAND 92 TURKEY 40 HONDURAS 44 GERMANY 2154
UNITEDKINGDOM 49 UNITEDKINGDOM 71 HONGKONG 184 GUATEMALA 396 BELGIUM 41
VIETNAM 51 VIETNAM 74 INDIA 78 HONDURAS 433 BRAZIL 71
INDONESIA 70 HONGKONG 2277 CHINAMNLND 1417
ARGENTINA 38 AUSTRALIA 87 ITALY 110 INDIA 1166 CHINATAIWAN 111
AUSTRALIA 73 BANGLADESH 41 JAPAN 176 INDONESIA 874 GERMANY 81
BANGLADESH 36 BELGIUM 132 MALAYSIA 67 ISRAEL 343 HONGKONG 157
BELGIUM 133 BRAZIL 223 NETHERLANDS 59 ITALY 1878 INDIA 55
BRAZIL 317 CHILE 84 PHILIPPINES 34 JAPAN 2154 INDONESIA 59
CHILE 98 CHINAMNLND 4226 SOUTHKOREA 118 MALAYSIA 888 ITALY 76
CHINAMNLND 3094 CHINATAIWAN 331 SPAIN 40 NETHERLANDS 1046 JAPAN 157
CHINATAIWAN 243 COLOMBIA 43 THAILAND 98 NEWZEALAND 187 MALAYSIA 56
























SOUTHKOREA 103 PAKISTAN 99 JAPAN 198 ITALY 121 AUSTRALIA 41
THAILAND 81 PHILIPPINES 104 MALAYSIA 76 JAPAN 148 BELGIUM 37
UNITEDKINGDOM 37 POLAND 41 NETHERLANDS 81 MALAYSIA 60 BRAZIL 69
VIETNAM 45 RUSSIA 59 PAKISTAN 34 NETHERLANDS 66 CHINAMNLND 2036
SINGAPORE 74 PHILIPPINES 38 SOUTHKOREA 100 CHINATAIWAN 159
AUSTRALIA 44 SOUTHAFRICA 55 SOUTHKOREA 133 SPAIN 45 GERMANY 76
BELGIUM 78 SOUTHKOREA 360 SPAIN 56 THAILAND 85 GUATEMALA 36
BRAZIL 184 SPAIN 174 THAILAND 111 UNITEDKINGDOM 63 HONDURAS 40
CHILE 59 SRILANKA 36 TURKEY 40 VIETNAM 47 HONGKONG 223
CHINAMNLND 1882 SWEDEN 71 UNITEDKINGDOM 77 INDIA 67
CHINATAIWAN 148 THAILAND 302 VIETNAM 62 CHINAMNLND 214 INDONESIA 81
COLOMBIA 51 TURKEY 120 ITALY 71
COSTARICA 93 UNITEDKINGDOM 240 BELGIUM 38 BELGIUM 45 JAPAN 232
DOMINICANREP 66 VENEZUELA 109 BRAZIL 58 BRAZIL 84 MALAYSIA 77
ECUADOR 38 VIETNAM 166 CHINAMNLND 650 CHINAMNLND 929 NETHERLANDS 36
FRANCE 54 CHINATAIWAN 51 CHINATAIWAN 73 PHILIPPINES 41
GERMANY 154 AUSTRALIA 85 GERMANY 76 GERMANY 89 SOUTHKOREA 150
GUATEMALA 54 BANGLADESH 36 HONGKONG 74 HONGKONG 104 THAILAND 113
HONDURAS 58 BELGIUM 77 INDIA 40 INDIA 52 VIETNAM 63
HONGKONG 212 BRAZIL 154 ITALY 65 INDONESIA 40
INDIA 98 CHILE 65 JAPAN 69 ITALY 81 ARGENTINA 63
INDONESIA 82 CHINAMNLND 3745 NETHERLANDS 37 JAPAN 99 AUSTRALIA 250
ITALY 143 CHINATAIWAN 294 SOUTHKOREA 47 MALAYSIA 40 BANGLADESH 104
JAPAN 202 COSTARICA 38 THAILAND 40 NETHERLANDS 44 BELGIUM 180
MALAYSIA 78 DOMINICANREP 34 UNITEDKINGDOM 36 SOUTHKOREA 66 BRAZIL 342
NETHERLANDS 76 ECUADOR 37 THAILAND 56 CHILE 176
PAKISTAN 34 FRANCE 52 AUSTRALIA 69 UNITEDKINGDOM 43 CHINAMNLND 11666
PHILIPPINES 40 GERMANY 155 BELGIUM 54 CHINATAIWAN 916
SOUTHKOREA 135 GUATEMALA 81 BRAZIL 91 BELGIUM 38 COLOMBIA 62
SPAIN 52 HONDURAS 89 CHILE 44 BRAZIL 63 COSTARICA 76
THAILAND 114 HONGKONG 412 CHINAMNLND 3615 CHINAMNLND 782 DOMINICANREP 69
TURKEY 38 INDIA 128 CHINATAIWAN 284 CHINATAIWAN 62 ECUADOR 102
UNITEDKINGDOM 71 INDONESIA 155 FRANCE 37 GERMANY 76 ELSALVADOR 81
VENEZUELA 58 ITALY 148 GERMANY 109 HONGKONG 88 FRANCE 124
VIETNAM 62 JAPAN 420 GUATEMALA 52 INDIA 44 GERMANY 365
MALAYSIA 144 HONDURAS 56 INDONESIA 34 GUATEMALA 228
ARGENTINA 58 NETHERLANDS 74 HONGKONG 389 ITALY 67 HONDURAS 249
AUSTRALIA 109 NEWZEALAND 38 INDIA 113 JAPAN 84 HONGKONG 1265
AUSTRIA 40 PAKISTAN 41 INDONESIA 137 NETHERLANDS 37 INDIA 378
BANGLADESH 60 PHILIPPINES 77 ITALY 104 SOUTHKOREA 56 INDONESIA 462
BELGIUM 257 SINGAPORE 52 JAPAN 427 THAILAND 47 ISRAEL 71
BRAZIL 448 SOUTHKOREA 273 MALAYSIA 129 UNITEDKINGDOM 36 ITALY 349
CHILE 122 SPAIN 49 NETHERLANDS 52 JAPAN 1352
CHINAMNLND 5012 THAILAND 212 PHILIPPINES 71 AUSTRALIA 49 MALAYSIA 431
CHINATAIWAN 393 TURKEY 43 SINGAPORE 47 BELGIUM 36 NETHERLANDS 176
COLOMBIA 95 UNITEDKINGDOM 69 SOUTHKOREA 269 BRAZIL 67 NEWZEALAND 111
COSTARICA 153 VIETNAM 118 SPAIN 34 CHILE 34 PAKISTAN 111
DENMARK 41 THAILAND 191 CHINAMNLND 2289 PERU 45
DOMINICANREP 133 AUSTRALIA 40 UNITEDKINGDOM 48 CHINATAIWAN 180 PHILIPPINES 234
ECUADOR 74 BELGIUM 84 VIETNAM 109 GERMANY 73 RUSSIA 47
ELSALVADOR 38 BRAZIL 146 GUATEMALA 44 SINGAPORE 155
FRANCE 179 CHILE 44 BELGIUM 69 HONDURAS 48 SOUTHAFRICA 58
GERMANY 503 CHINAMNLND 1849 BRAZIL 128 HONGKONG 249 SOUTHKOREA 867
GUATEMALA 102 CHINATAIWAN 146 CHILE 38 INDIA 74 SPAIN 114
HONDURAS 111 COSTARICA 44 CHINAMNLND 1399 INDONESIA 91 SRILANKA 52
HONGKONG 565 DOMINICANREP 38 CHINATAIWAN 110 ITALY 69 SWEDEN 52
INDIA 283 FRANCE 58 COSTARICA 49 JAPAN 265 THAILAND 633
INDONESIA 217 GERMANY 163 DOMINICANREP 41 MALAYSIA 85 TURKEY 100
ISRAEL 82 GUATEMALA 36 FRANCE 47 NETHERLANDS 34 UNITEDKINGDOM 161
ITALY 449 HONDURAS 40 GERMANY 133 PHILIPPINES 45 VENEZUELA 66
JAPAN 537 HONGKONG 209 HONDURAS 36 SOUTHKOREA 170 VIETNAM 357
MALAYSIA 214 INDIA 98 HONGKONG 158 THAILAND 125
NETHERLANDS 249 INDONESIA 80 INDIA 78 VIETNAM 70 BELGIUM 38

























CHINAMNLND 1286 HONGKONG 38 JAPAN 56 INDONESIA 37 CHINATAIWAN 55
CHINATAIWAN 100 JAPAN 36 SOUTHKOREA 37 ITALY 77 GERMANY 56
GERMANY 77 AUSTRALIA 59 JAPAN 91 HONGKONG 78
HONGKONG 144 AUSTRALIA 99 BELGIUM 93 MALAYSIA 38 INDIA 34
INDIA 54 BANGLADESH 45 NETHERLANDS 43 ITALY 51
INDONESIA 55 BELGIUM 78 AUSTRALIA 59 SOUTHKOREA 62 JAPAN 76
ITALY 73 BRAZIL 132 BELGIUM 93 THAILAND 52 SOUTHKOREA 51
JAPAN 140 CHILE 62 CHINAMNLND 2676 UNITEDKINGDOM 41 THAILAND 41
MALAYSIA 52 CHINAMNLND 5273 CHINATAIWAN 210
NETHERLANDS 37 CHINATAIWAN 414 COLOMBIA 38 AUSTRALIA 49 BELGIUM 38
SOUTHKOREA 92 ECUADOR 34 COSTARICA 55 BELGIUM 87 BRAZIL 77
THAILAND 76 FRANCE 54 DOMINICANREP 47 BRAZIL 205 CHINAMNLND 1201
UNITEDKINGDOM 34 GERMANY 159 ECUADOR 43 CHILE 69 CHINATAIWAN 95
VIETNAM 43 GUATEMALA 71 FRANCE 65 CHINAMNLND 2116 GERMANY 76
HONDURAS 77 GERMANY 188 CHINATAIWAN 166 HONGKONG 135
AUSTRALIA 70 HONGKONG 566 GUATEMALA 59 COLOMBIA 55 INDIA 52
BELGIUM 54 INDIA 163 HONDURAS 65 COSTARICA 99 INDONESIA 52
BRAZIL 107 INDONESIA 198 HONGKONG 300 DOMINICANREP 71 ITALY 70
CHILE 56 ITALY 151 INDIA 121 ECUADOR 45 JAPAN 131
CHINAMNLND 3075 JAPAN 627 INDONESIA 114 FRANCE 59 MALAYSIA 48
CHINATAIWAN 242 MALAYSIA 188 ITALY 172 GERMANY 170 NETHERLANDS 37
ECUADOR 34 NETHERLANDS 77 JAPAN 290 GUATEMALA 63 SOUTHKOREA 87
FRANCE 37 NEWZEALAND 43 MALAYSIA 109 HONDURAS 69 THAILAND 71
GERMANY 109 PAKISTAN 48 NETHERLANDS 91 HONGKONG 239 UNITEDKINGDOM 34
GUATEMALA 82 PHILIPPINES 103 PAKISTAN 43 INDIA 110 VIETNAM 40
HONDURAS 91 SINGAPORE 69 PHILIPPINES 55 INDONESIA 93
HONGKONG 335 SOUTHKOREA 393 SINGAPORE 38 ITALY 159 BRAZIL 38
INDIA 102 SPAIN 49 SOUTHKOREA 194 JAPAN 225 CHINAMNLND 712
INDONESIA 124 THAILAND 278 SPAIN 62 MALAYSIA 88 CHINATAIWAN 56
ITALY 106 TURKEY 43 THAILAND 158 NETHERLANDS 84 GERMANY 40
JAPAN 352 UNITEDKINGDOM 70 TURKEY 47 PAKISTAN 38 HONGKONG 80
MALAYSIA 115 VIETNAM 158 UNITEDKINGDOM 85 PHILIPPINES 44 ITALY 37
NETHERLANDS 52 VENEZUELA 43 SOUTHKOREA 151 JAPAN 78
PHILIPPINES 62 CHINAMNLND 523 VIETNAM 88 SPAIN 58 SOUTHKOREA 52
SINGAPORE 41 CHINATAIWAN 41 THAILAND 128 THAILAND 41
SOUTHKOREA 225 HONGKONG 58 BELGIUM 44 TURKEY 44
SPAIN 34 JAPAN 58 BRAZIL 71 UNITEDKINGDOM 80 BRAZIL 34
THAILAND 170 SOUTHKOREA 38 CHINAMNLND 857 VENEZUELA 60 CHINAMNLND 374
UNITEDKINGDOM 48 CHINATAIWAN 67 VIETNAM 70 GERMANY 34
VIETNAM 96 CHINAMNLND 512 GERMANY 88 HONGKONG 43
CHINATAIWAN 40 HONGKONG 98 BRAZIL 47 JAPAN 40
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